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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the influence of institutions in the development of policies 
dealing with adult intimate relationships in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States 
between 1990 and 2014. Over this period, the social importance and acceptance of non-
“traditional” relationships has increased in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. 
However, despite all three countries working from what Gauthier describes as a “non-
interventionist” approach to family policy, relationships policies have developed in markedly 
different ways in each. I argue that divergent translations of similar social trends are the result 
of differences between the structures of decision-making and institutions of interest 
representation in each country, and of policy legacies that make particular policy avenues 
more readily accessible. Electoral systems, parliamentary procedures and party structures 
govern which interests are able to exercise power within legislatures, while other institutions 
such as courts, bureaucracies, and law commissions contribute to the policy-making process 
in different ways. Countries are less likely to move in a non-interventionist or pro-egalitarian 
relationships policy direction where candidate selection procedures allow religious 
conservatives to play a significant role in both major parties, but religious conservatives have 
had little success in reversing non-interventionist policy changes after the fact. Instead, pro-
traditionalist policy changes are typically minor regulatory changes or expenditures that are 
vulnerable to budget pressures. Legal interests expressed through law commissions or justice 
bureaucracies have a key role in enabling transitions to non-interventionist policies, 
particularly in the treatment of non-marital relationships, although the treatment of these 
relationships in core government activities such as taxation and welfare may also contribute 
to decisions in this area.  
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GLOSSARY 
ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACL: Australian Christian Lobby 
AFDC: Aid for Families of Dependent 
Children 
AIFS: Australian Institute of Family 
Studies 
ALP: Australian Labor Party 
ALRC: Australian Law Reform 
Commission\ 
AZRS: Arizona Revised Statutes 
BDM Tasmania: Births, Deaths and 
Marriages Tasmania 
CAFC: California Family Code 
CALRC: California Law Revision 
Commission 
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
CDR: Crude Divorce Rate (annual 
divorces per 1,000 population) 
CMR: Crude Marriage Rate (annual 
marriages per 1,000 population) 
CTLRC: Connecticut Law Revision 
Commission 
CUA: Civil Union Act 
CWfA: Concerned Women for America 
DHS: Department of Human Services 
DNC: Democratic National Committee 
DOMA: Defence of Marriage Act 
EGTRRA: Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act 
EITC: Earned Income Tax Credit 
FLA: Family Law Act 
FPA: Family Protection Act 
FPP: First-past-the-post voting system 
FTB-B: Family Tax Benefit B 
GLAAD: (formerly) Gay & Lesbian 
Alliance Against Defamation 
GLAD: Gay & Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders 
HIRS: Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes 
HMRF: Healthy Marriage & Responsible 
Fatherhood 
IRS: Internal Revenue Service 
LARS: Louisiana Revised Statutes 
LPA: Liberal Party of Australia 
MMP: mixed-member proportional voting 
system 
MTRRA: Marriage Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act 
NCHS: National Center for Health 
Statistics 
NCWNZ: National Council of Women of 
New Zealand 
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NJLRC: New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission 
NPA: National Party of Australia 
NSWLRC: New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission 
NWPC: National Women’s Political 
Caucus 
NZEC: New Zealand Electoral 
Commission 
NZLC: New Zealand Law Commission 
NZLP: New Zealand Labour Party 
NZNP: New Zealand National Party 
NZRL: New Zealand Rainbow Labour 
OKS: Oklahoma Statutes 
PRA: Property (Relationships) Act 
PRAA: Property (Relationships) 
Amendment Act 
PRWORA: Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
QLDLRC: Queensland Law Reform 
Commission 
RNC: Republican National Committee 
RSRB: Relationships (Statutory 
References) Bill 
TXFC: Texas Family Code 
USBLS: United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
USC: United States Code
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INTRODUCTION 
Intimate relationships are crucial to human wellbeing on a number of levels. For 
individuals, intimate relationships represent emotional support or strain, religious or cultural 
fulfilment, sexual satisfaction or frustration, and financial security or anxiety. Intimate 
relationships knot individuals and families together with more or less firmness and provide a 
venue for the conception, nurturing and education of children. These “private” relationships 
have significant public consequences. The division of labour within intimate relationships has 
profound effects not only on the individuals involved, who may find accomplishment or 
oppression, but also on work environments and economies. The strength and character of 
intimate relationships may burden or unburden communities and governments.  
Despite the importance of these intimate relationships, and despite the fact that 
governments intervene in them in a number of ways, comparative social policy theorists have 
not dealt with the question of why substantial differences exist between these interventions. 
My interest in the area originated from learning about Singapore’s government dating agency 
(the Social Development Network) and wondering (from the perspective of somebody living 
in a liberal democracy) how such a policy could arise. I explored the development of 
marriage policies in Singapore and Malaysia in my Honours research, finding that their 
character was influenced by the ways in which political institutions (and particularly the 
structures of the dominant parties) shaped the interactions of and opportunities for different 
political interests (including ethnic, religious, and gender-based interests). In this thesis I 
develop that work by exploring how political and policy institutions have shaped the 
development of relationships policies (defined in Chapter 2) in New Zealand, Australia, and 
the United States of America between 1990 and 2014. 
Exploring the development of relationships policies in liberal democracies is 
particularly interesting because of the assumption of privacy that surrounds intimate 
relationships in these countries. Questions of privacy and individual responsibility may arise 
around all kinds of policy; citizens may very well object to the government attempting to 
control how they spend their money, or how they raise their children, but government 
involvement in intimate relationships takes this to an extreme, raising the spectre of 
bureaucrats or politicians hiding under the bed. In regulating relationships and offering 
relationship services, policy-makers must navigate highly emotive privacy concerns, as well 
as related concerns about “social engineering”. 
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The institutional context in which these debates occur is important because it shapes 
which voices are privileged and which policy options are politically viable. The structures of 
political parties and electoral systems are important elements of this because relationships 
policy is an area in which right-wing and left-wing parties are not necessarily united. The 
balance of socially-conservative and socially-liberal representatives within major parties and 
the degree of independence afforded to these representatives by their leaders affect the nature 
and success of policy reforms. Electoral systems and party structures mediate this balance of 
interests and affect the degree of control that leaders may wield. Other institutional features 
such as constitutions, courts, and public participation processes also constrain or sway 
representatives’ choices. 
Over the course of this research I found it necessary to discuss the role of policies 
themselves as institutions that help to determine what kinds of policy change are possible. 
Even where broad patterns of relationships policy are similar across countries, the details of 
how policies are structured may affect their future direction. Policy changes may be difficult 
for both technical and ideological reasons. Relationships have implications for core activities 
such as welfare and taxation, so policy-makers usually avoid making changes to the treatment 
of relationships that could disrupt these activities. Policy-makers may be equally cautious 
about changing the treatment of relationships because of public suspicions about government 
intruding on individual, private relationships or the social institutions that surround these 
relationships. At the same time, however, existing policies may facilitate certain changes by 
providing concepts for policy-makers to use. 
My first chapter discusses the available literature on political institutional influences 
on policy-making, the development of comparative social policy (and the gaps in the policy 
areas it deals with), and family law scholars’ assessments of the development of relationships 
policy. My second chapter explains the use of a most-similar-systems design, outlines the key 
concepts of adult relationship, relationships policy, and institution, and outlines my methods 
for gathering and analysing data. 
My third chapter deals with the social and institutional context of each country. I 
show that trends of relationship formation and termination are broadly similar across the 
three countries (although there are differences in how the three countries gather data that 
hinder direct comparison), and explain key differences in legislative structures, electoral 
systems, participatory practices and the role of judicial review. The next three chapters 
outline the development of relationships policies in each country, observing and interpreting 
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both consistent policies and policy changes that relate to relationship entrance and definition, 
relationship exit, and (for Australia and America), other policies that do not easily fall into 
these categories. 
My seventh chapter adapts Gauthier’s typology of family policy ideal-types for the 
purposes of characterising relationships policies to demonstrate how relationships policies in 
the three countries have shifted in relation to ideological positions on the state’s role in adult 
relationships. My eighth chapter explores the role that early policy decisions have played in 
subsequent policy decisions in certain areas, and how political institutions have shaped 
relationships policy decisions by creating or denying opportunities for religious 
conservatives, women (especially feminists), LGBT activists, and legal interests. 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM AND POLICY 
The study of institutions has a long history in comparative political science and 
policy. Peters (1999, pp. 3–11) suggests that institutionalist thought was an important element 
of political philosophy from the time of Aristotle until the mid-twentieth century. This “old 
institutionalism” suggested that understanding how political systems were structured would 
allow analysts to predict their outcomes, regardless of the actors within the system. More 
recent “new institutionalist” scholarship provides a space for the integration of behaviouralist 
or rationalist approaches (Peters, 1999, pp. 15–17). Ultimately, however, all institutionalist 
approaches to comparative policy studies operate from the basis that political institutions 
govern the rules of policy development. Moser (1999, p. 2) points out that, in a system where 
policies were automatically determined by the will of an ever-changing majority of voters, 
policies and markets would be highly unstable. Political institutions provide the necessary 
stability by shaping the incentives influencing actors, providing certain actors or interests 
with “agenda setting rights”, creating veto points of varying strengths, and controlling the 
flow of information.  
A number of scholars have attempted to ascertain the effect of a small set of 
institutional variables on government spending. Bradbury & Crain (2001) find an association 
between higher levels of government spending and larger legislatures, and that bicameralism 
reduces this effect. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002, pp. 647–648) find that electoral system type is 
also important, as majoritarian systems tend to focus their spending on geographically-
targetable public goods, whilst proportional systems focus on universal transfers. These 
findings, though not directly related to relationships policy, do indicate that different electoral 
systems cause politicians to address different constituencies, so they may affect whose 
desires are privileged in relationships policy-making. 
Orellana (2010, p. 622) finds that electoral systems affect how quickly countries 
respond meaningfully to controversial issues (same-sex relationships and climate change). 
Orellana suggests that countries with proportional electoral systems address these issues 
rapidly because their systems allow fringe parties to enter the political system and push for 
action. Ezrow (2011, pp. 316–317) finds that political parties in proportional systems adjust 
their policies to court the median voter, while parties in non-proportional systems do not. 
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Ezrow and Orellana’s findings seem somewhat contradictory, but it is possible that fringe 
parties simply allow new issues to become part of the mainstream political debate. Picot 
(2014, p. 141) further complicates these findings by suggesting that systems with large 
numbers of parties, including strong “anti-system” parties, only produce incremental reforms, 
and focus on specific groups of voters, while less polarised party systems will focus on 
policies that affect large numbers of voters. 
Heidenheimer (1973) mixes cultural and institutional explanations of policy change in 
his comparison of the development of welfare and education services in Europe and the 
United States. Heidenheimer suggests that policy development is related to popular and 
professional faith in particular institutions, and beliefs about which level of governance 
(local, state, or federal) is appropriate for a particular policy. Moreover, the mass movement 
party form present in Europe could more readily present policies targeting “broad social 
goals” (rather than local interests) than the looser American parties (Heidenheimer, 1973, p. 
335). Pedersen (2012, p. 299) finds that party organisations also affect the behaviour of 
representatives within multiparty systems. Where party organisations have more control over 
their representatives, these representatives will tend to pursue “policy purity” rather than 
“policy influence”. 
COMPARATIVE POLICY STUDIES 
Comparative social policy, which originated in the 1970s with the work of scholars 
such as Wilensky, Heclo, and Titmuss, initially focused primarily on comparing levels of 
state expenditure, rather than analysing where this money was spent, or the effects of social 
policies on families. Wilensky (1975) used regression analysis to explain the growth of the 
“welfare state” (as expressed by growth in state welfare expenditure) as the outcome of 
structural and demographic changes. Heclo (1974, p. 317), produced a more complex picture 
of welfare development through a case study based approach. This allowed him to identify 
that important social policy changes in Britain and Sweden were not merely reactions to 
structural forces, but also reactions against the values embedded in past policies. Both Heclo 
(1974) and Titmuss (1974) pay attention to the character of welfare policies, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the amount of welfare provided by a state. Titmuss (1974, pp. 31–32) 
identifies “residual”, “industrial achievement-performance” and “institutional redistributive” 
models to describe different bases of entitlement to welfare.  
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Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s theory of “welfare regimes” reinvigorated comparative 
social policy debates in the 1990s. Esping-Andersen studied the development of eighteen 
welfare states, identifying ideal-typical “socialist, conservative, and liberal regime-type[s]", 
based on the variables of “decommodification” and “stratification”, around which these states 
clustered (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 222). These ideal-types are analogous to Titmuss’ 
earlier models of welfare entitlement. Liberal welfare regimes are weakly decommodifying, 
as they use a residual basis for entitlement, in which the state limits its interventions to the 
neediest groups. Conservative regimes use social insurance mechanisms that compensate the 
unemployed based on their historic contributions; while these systems may be more 
decommodifying than residual models, they also reinforce income stratification, because 
higher earners normally receive greater compensation. Socialist (social democratic) regimes 
provide generous, often universal benefits, a more decommodifying and destratifying 
approach. 
Esping-Andersen’s theory has proved a fruitful source of debate, as a number of 
scholars have suggested adjusted ideal-types or additional ideal-types, whether to better 
reflect the diversity they see in the Western world (Arts & Gelissen, 2002), or to offer a basis 
for classifying Majority World welfare states (Gough, 2004; Wood, 2004). Both Esping-
Andersen and his successors acknowledge the importance of the relationship between 
individual, family and state to particular welfare regimes, but the chief focus of their work 
has been on income protection, rather than family policy. Consequently, Esping-Andersen’s 
classifications cannot adequately explain the development of family policy. Hantrais (1994) 
found that two supposedly archetypal conservative welfare regimes (France and Germany) 
deploy strongly differentiated family policies. 
During the 1990s, however, a series of feminist scholars criticised conventional 
welfare regimes theory for its lack of attention to the effects of the welfare state on women. 
Lewis (1992, p. 161) points out that men typically receive benefits as workers, and women as 
carers, so that the welfare state reproduces a gendered division of labour. Orloff (1996, p. 53) 
sees the development of welfare states as “a transition from ‘private’ to ‘public’ patriarchy”. 
She suggests that the post-war “family wage” contributed to women’s dependency and that 
“traditional marriage” serves to maintain male dominance. Whereas Esping-Andersen’s 
elucidations of his ideal-types paid particular attention to “traditional” families as an 
important part of the conservative regime in particular, his feminist critics suggest that 
women are used, in different ways, by all regime types (Lewis, 1992). O’Connor et al. (1999) 
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point to a series of ideas carried from classical to “New” or “Social” liberalism to explain the 
patriarchal tendencies of liberal welfare regimes. In particular, the concept of the male 
breadwinner family was sustained under New Liberalism, partly as a result of the efforts of 
maternalist movements that celebrated domesticity (O’Connor et al., 1999, p. 51).  
Orloff (2009, p. 320) suggests that an exclusive focus on social insurance and similar 
policies in comparative social policy betrays a “masculinist” worldview, necessitating a 
counterbalancing focus on the “social policy institutions” that shape women’s welfare. 
Although Walby (2009) points out that most government institutions and policies are 
gendered, including monetary policy and the tax system, this refocusing has largely 
concentrated on family policy. A number of authors, including Jane Lewis (1992) and 
Gauthier (1996), offer their own interpretations of how different welfare regimes affect 
gender relations. Lewis examines how policy affects women’s roles in the labour and care 
markets, with emphases on labour and income support policies, and the state’s involvement 
in childcare provision. Gauthier concentrates more heavily on family policy, examining the 
development of child payments and maternity leave, but also examining regulations on 
contraception and abortion. 
Lewis and Gauthier reference the male-breadwinner family in their alternatives to 
Esping-Andersen’s system. Lewis (1992) suggests that there are “strong”, “modified”, and 
“weak” male breadwinner regimes, typified by Britain, France, and Sweden respectively. 
Gauthier (1996) identifies “pro-traditionalist” and “pro-egalitarian” regimes that aim to 
respectively reinforce and undermine the male breadwinner model. Alongside these, 
however, Gauthier identifies “pro-family but non-interventionist” regimes that are ambivalent 
toward the institution of the traditional family, intervening only to prevent extreme hardship, 
and “pro-natalist” regimes that intervene in the family for the purpose of raising national 
fertility levels. Castles (1996) identifies a “male-breadwinner” regime as a supplement (rather 
than alternative) to Esping-Andersen’s classifications, describing the pre-1980s Antipodean 
welfare systems that used family wages to ensure that men could support their families (while 
providing lower wages to workers in female-dominated occupations). 
While welfare states theorists’ discussion of “male breadwinners” and “nuclear 
families” reflects the view of Halford & van Acker (2012, p. 454) that social policy in the 
Western world focuses on marriage, discussion of policies around care provision and 
workforce integration dwarfs direct discussion of policies about adult relationships in 
comparative family policy. Focused, cross-national comparisons of adult relationships 
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policies are rare. Van Acker (2008) provides an account of the development of  marriage 
education policies in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, through which 
governments may attempt to shape both the form and functioning of families (Halford & van 
Acker, 2012). Freeman & Lyon (1983), taking a highly critical view of marriage, suggest that 
legal treatment of cohabitation is drifting closer to that of marriage across a wide  range of 
countries. Other authors adopt classificatory approaches to study cohabitation policies, both 
within the United States (Bowman, 2004) and cross-nationally (Garrison & Scott, 2012).  
Weston et al. (2012, p. 12) argue that policy-makers are interested primarily in 
assessing or addressing the effects of changing patterns of family formation at the expense of 
supporting them in their functioning. However, the New Zealand Families Commission’s 
incoming briefing (Ministry of Social Development, 2004) focused on family function, 
pointing to a need to support a wide variety of family forms to fulfil their functions. Glennon 
(2008, p. 25) suggests that the importance of form in British family policy eroded towards the 
end of the twentieth century with a shift towards the “contractualization of adult 
relationships”. Policies that target family form may be seen as unjust interventions into the 
private lives of consenting adults. Theoretically, this should be salient throughout the 
“liberal” world, given the liberal conception of family and state as separate spheres 
(O’Connor et al., 1999).  
FAMILY LAW 
The development of some areas of relationships policy is addressed in family law 
literature. Harrison (2002) and Atkin et al. (2013) describe major changes in family law in 
Australia and New Zealand respectively, both in technical terms and, to an extent, ideological 
terms, and discuss some of the social conditions surrounding these changes. Atkin et al. 
(2013, pp. 648, 655) suggest that a shift in the basis of concepts of family from status to 
function and a recognition of the “paramountcy” of protecting children’s interests are central 
to changes in family law in New Zealand. Harrison (2002, pp. 9–10) identifies the increased 
use of dispute resolution as a key development in Australia. Graycar (2012, p. 243) suggests 
that the care of children has become the most contested area of family law in Australia, rather 
than matters directly connected with relationships. 
Concerning the United States, Garrison (2008), like Bauman (2004), points out that, 
while the prevalence of bars on court protection of cohabitants has diminished, they have 
largely been replaced by contracting, or in some cases registration, rather than “prescriptive” 
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measures. Ver Steegh (2008) suggests that alternative dispute resolution is also an 
increasingly important part of American family law, although court funding constraints may 
threaten some services. In addition, according to Oldham (2008), property division 
regulations at divorce are becoming increasingly similar, as common-law states have adopted 
community property at separation, but there remains a great variety in what is considered 
property.  
While this work is valuable for describing the trajectories that various elements of 
relationships policy have taken, it is not necessarily as useful for explaining why particular 
changes have or have not taken place. While Garrison (2008) and Ver Steegh (2008) compare 
American policies to those of similar countries (including, in the case of Garrison, New 
Zealand and Australia), they do not attempt to explain the differences. Moreover, while these 
authors relate changes in family law to changes in society (Atkin et al., 2013, pp. 665–666), 
they do not provide a clear picture of how these social changes occur. This is problematic 
because, while policies have certainly changed in each country, and it is reasonable to suggest 
that social changes are an important causal factor, these changes have not been uniform. 
Analysing the development of relationships policies from an institutionalist perspective 
provides an opportunity to explain how similar social trends might produce different policy 
outcomes in different countries. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
This research takes a theory-building approach to comparative social policy, 
attempting to explain variation in relationships policies within similar welfare regimes by 
exploring the institutional contexts in which policy actors attempt to translate social changes 
and ideas about marriage and family into policy. Without using a comparative approach it is 
impossible to determine which aspects of the complex system that is a country are genuinely 
significant. While making absolute generalisations about policy development remains 
problematic because of the sheer variety that exists within and between countries, 
comparative research nonetheless allows us to focus on the most significant factors. I use a 
“societal” style of analysis that recognises policy development as the outcome of the 
interaction of a variety of factors on multiple levels (Hantrais, 2004). In order to understand 
how these interactions occur within particular settings, I use a case study-based qualitative 
approach. 
CASE SELECTION 
Case study approaches to comparative research require careful case selection. 
Landman (2008, p. 70) suggests that either a Most Similar Systems or Most Different 
Systems design is preferable. Most Similar Systems is most appropriate when attempting to 
isolate the variables that cause similar cases to produce different outcomes, while Most 
Different Systems is useful for determining the variables that cause different cases to produce 
similar outcomes (Gerring, 2008, pp. 668–673). I use a Most Similar Systems design because 
my central research interest is determining why variations in relationships policies exist in 
spite of similar social trends 
The complexity of countries as “systems” means that it is impossible to control for 
every possible relevant factor. In selecting my cases, I used welfare regime and family policy 
regime types, and patterns of relationship choice as the bases for similarity. According to 
these criteria, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States are similar systems because their 
welfare regimes are similarly classified in the literature as “liberal” or “residual” (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, pp. 77, 85), and their family policy regimes are similarly classified as “non-
familialist” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 86), or as “low support” (Gauthier, 1996, p. 189). 
While there are some differences in relationship formation patterns between the three 
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countries, and some statistics are difficult to compare directly (as discussed later), similar 
trends are nevertheless apparent in each country. 
CONCEPTS 
Jones (1985) and Kennett (2004) suggest that articulating transferrable concepts is a 
key problem for comparative research. While studying equivalent phenomena in each case is 
usually most troublesome when language differences are involved, actors and institutions 
may differ in their understandings of key concepts such as family both inter- and intra-
nationally. In this case, however, many such concepts are objects of study; how a state 
defines family in its policies may be significant for identifying the model of relationships 
policy at hand. Defining family through reference to marriage, for example, may be a marker 
of a pro-traditionalist outlook. 
Adult relationship 
The key concepts in this research are adult relationship and relationships policy. 
Adult relationship describes a personal relationship between two (or, in theory, more) adults 
that involves a significant level of interdependency. An adult relationship becomes significant 
for this research when a state elects to make a policy (relationships policy) – that regulates its 
formation, character or conclusion, or that employs the relationship or a function associated 
with such a relationship, as the basis for rights, responsibilities and entitlements. 
While such open-ended definitions of adult relationship and relationships policy are 
somewhat awkward, they are necessary to reflect the diversity of relationships which states 
may now potentially recognise. In my previous work comparing the development of similar 
policies in Malaysia and Singapore, the term marriage policy covered the relationship 
interventions at hand. Within liberal democracies, however, marriage describes only one set 
of recognised adult relationships. Cohabitation, while potentially incorporating a greater 
variety of relationships, is also unsatisfactory because, while some government policies may 
target cohabitants rather than a particular relationship status, people do not necessarily have 
to live together to be partners in a significant relationship. 
Institutions 
Hodgson (2006, p. 2) suggests that, while the meaning of institutions is highly 
contested within the social sciences, the term essentially describes “systems of established 
and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions”. This includes both “formal” and 
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“informal” institutions – although most institutions will consist of a mixture of social 
conventions and formal rules. Most of the institutions examined in this research are primarily 
formally-constituted, but it is be important to consider how informal conventions interact 
with formal rules within some of these.  
DATA COLLECTION 
The initial stage of data collection involved reading literature on the development of 
family policy and family law in each country to identify relevant legislation, court judgments 
and other policy documents. While the main time scope for data collection covered policies 
from 1990 to July 2014, I collected some data on significant policy changes outside this time 
frame in order to tell the complete policy “story” for each country. To ensure that I would 
identify recent developments, I searched government, news, and political party websites for 
adult relationship-related terms. In the case of the United States, where many relationships 
policies are developed at the state-level, I selected five states (California, Hawaiʻi, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Vermont) to investigate deeply based on their purported significance in the 
literature as leaders of significant changes in relationships policy, collecting the entirety of 
their family or “domestic relations” legislation. To supplement this, I used the most recent 
edition of the National handbook of state laws (Leiter, 2008) and collected narrower samples 
of policies from a wider range of states on particular issues (Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Wisconsin). 
In order to contextualise these policies, I gathered both primary and secondary data on 
policy debates, social changes, interest group activities, and political institutions and rules. 
The primary sources included manifestos, constitutions and websites (where available) for 
major political parties or presidential candidates; legislative debates; legislative committee 
reports and interest group submissions; law commission reports; and interest group websites. 
In order to access historical websites, I used the internet archives of archive.org, the National 
Library of New Zealand, and the Library of Congress. My secondary sources included social 
and political histories, literature on policy-making and historical news sources. 
ANALYSIS 
Characterising policies 
The first step in my analysis involved a broad classification of policies as a) policies 
concerning relationship formation and definition, b) policies concerning relationship 
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termination, or c) policies involving incentive systems. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, particularly in the case of property division laws for de facto relationships, which 
may establish the formation of a relationship only in retrospect, but they served as a useful 
entry point to the data. After completing an overview of the relationships policies in each area 
for each country, I used the ideological positions underpinning Gauthier’s ideal-types to 
interrogate these policies. This involved asking: 
 What is the purpose of state intervention? 
o How does a policy reinforce or undermine the institution of the traditional 
family? 
o What level of family function does a policy seek to achieve? 
From this work, I devised a set of policy positions that correspond to each ideal-type, 
and used these to identify the character of policies and policy changes, and to tentatively 
apply this to the relationships policies of each country as a whole.  
Institutional influences 
In developing an explanation for differences in how the character of relationships 
policy in each country has changed over time, I adopted a mixed institutionalist approach. 
Firstly, I drew from historical institutionalist concerns about the importance of “policy 
legacies” in controlling the policy process through “path dependency” and – in consequence 
– what policies emerge (Schmidt, 2009, p. 128). This involved isolating policy areas to 
determine whether they meet three criteria for path dependence: contingency, early 
sensitivity, and inertia (Mahoney, 2000, p. 511). I then explored the question of why path 
dependence would occur in particular relationships policy areas and the effects of policy 
stability in one area on other areas. 
Path dependence is an incomplete explanation for uneven policy development because 
it does not adequately explain the forces that cause policy changes. While Strach’s (2007, pp. 
12–13) focus on “policy gaps” is useful for showing how early policy decisions react with 
changing social norms, Strach does not fully explore the influence of policy-makers in 
choosing how to address these gaps. Peters (1999, pp. 116–117) suggests that how 
institutions shape the interaction of political interests is significant for determining policy 
outcomes. My previous research into Malaysia and Singapore, which found that how 
electoral and party systems shaped the interaction of different ethnic, religious, and gender 
interests affected the development of marriage policies, supports this theory. I take a holistic 
approach, examining how different levels of the policy-making system interact to give veto 
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and agenda-setting powers to particular interest groups and alliances of interest groups. While 
this cannot fully explain policy decisions, as policy-makers are, ultimately, people, with their 
own beliefs, priorities, strengths and weaknesses, who will not always respond ‘rationally’ to 
the situations that confront them, and strong leaders may certainly have outsize effects, 
political and policy institutions will nevertheless affect what kinds of people enter influential 
positions, and what those positions allow them to do. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXTS 
RELATIONSHIP CHOICE TRENDS 
Changing patterns of relationship formation provide one explanation for changing 
relationships policies. However, a singular focus on demographic change cannot sufficiently 
explain the variation that exists in how policies have changed (discussed in chapters 4-7) 
because, although marriage remains most popular in the United States, each country has 
experienced similar, dramatic changes in relationship formation and exit over recent decades. 
During World War II and its immediate aftermath, marriage rates rose dramatically 
(Department of Statistics, 1988, p. 136; Espenshade, 2005, p. 205; Krupinski, 1974, pp. 6–9), 
and while marriage rates fell somewhat after the post-war boom, they rose thereafter to new 
peaks. Australia reached a crude marriage rate (CMR, marriages per 1,000 population) of 9.3 
in 1970 (ABS, 1974, p. 172), while New Zealand peaked at 9.5 in 1971 (Statistics NZ, 
2014b), and the United States reached 10.9 in 1972 (NCHS, 1983b, p. 4). Since this point, the 
marriage rates in each country have dropped dramatically, although this has been most 
pronounced in New Zealand, where the CMR hit a low of 4.3 in 2013 (Statistics NZ, 2014b), 
while the United States reached 6.8 in 2011 (CDC, 2013c). Australia shows a slightly 
different trend, as its CMR hit 5.3 in 2001, and has since remained stable (R. E. Weston, Qu, 
& AIFS, 2013, p. 3). 
These changes have been accompanied by corresponding changes in the age of first 
marriage. High marriage rates were driven by large numbers of early marriages; in the post-
war period median ages at first marriage in each country dropped to 20-21 for women 
(Krupinski, 1974, p. 9; NCHS, 1974; Statistics NZ, 2001, p. 7). Krupinski suggests that the 
rise of early marriages had a flow-on effect in the character of marriage, because young 
couples without the resources necessary to establish a joint household needed two incomes to 
develop their asset base. From around 1975, however, the median age at first marriage began 
to rise; the median age at first marriage for women has risen to 28.6 in New Zealand, 28.1 in 




A rise in cohabitation as a prelude or alternative to marriage has contributed to these 
falling marriage rates and increasing ages of marriage. Comparing cohabitation statistics is 
                                                 
1
 2013 estimates for New Zealand and the US, 2012 estimate for Australia. 
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somewhat problematic, particularly between countries, as definitions of cohabitation vary 
substantially. Nevertheless, it is clear that rates of cohabitation have risen considerably. In 
New Zealand, 409,000 people identified as de facto partners in 2013, 22.3% of partnered 
respondents, close to 300,000 more than in 1988 (Department of Statistics, 1988, p. 141; 
Statistics NZ, 2013). 
Fewer than 6% of partnered Australians identified themselves as being in a de facto 
relationship in 1986, but the 2011 census found that 16.2% of the “socially married” were in 
“de facto marriages” (ABS, 1997, p. 24, 2011). These references may not necessarily capture 
all cohabitants, however, as many may not consider themselves married, or may even be 
cohabiting, rather than legally married, to avoid the concept. The ABS has also identified a 
considerable increase in the rate of premarital cohabitation. Only 3% of couples who married 
in the 1960s and were still married in 2006-7 cohabited before marriage, while more than half 
of couples did so in 1992, and the proportion is now close to 80% (ABS, 2009, p. 10, 2012, p. 
13). 
The US Census does not record cohabitants. However, Bumpass & Sweet (1989, p. 
617) estimated that, in 1987-1988, around 4% of Americans older than 19 were cohabiting, 
including a sixth of never-married 25-34 year olds. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 
2010, pp. 17–18) does not provide a figure for the whole population, but estimated that 
around 9% of Americans cohabited in 2002, including about a third of never-married 25-34 
year olds. Copen et al. (2013, p. 9) found that cohabitation was the first union for somewhat 
fewer than half of American women who had lived in a coresidential union in 1995, but by 
2006-2010 marriage was the first union for only a third of this group of women. 
Divorce is commonplace in contemporary society, although it is not increasing in 
prevalence as many Americans apparently believe (Pew Research Center, 2010, p. 19). The 
rate of divorce in each country rose steadily from the early-1960s to early 1980s. Between 
1961 and 1982, the Australian crude divorce rate (CDR, divorces per 1,000 population) grew 
from 0.7 to 2.9 (ABS, 2008), while the American CDR grew from 2.2 in 1961 to 5.2 in 1980 
(NCHS, 1983a, p. 4). Statistics New Zealand (2014c) reports the divorce rate per 1,000 
marriages rather than a CDR; this climbed from 3.2 in 1961 to 11.9 in 1981. 
Wolfinger (2005, p. 410) suggests that conservative claims that no-fault divorce is 
responsible for these increases lack a sound basis. It is clear from the Australian and New 
Zealand rates that no-fault divorce causes spikes in divorce rates in the near-term; the New 
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Zealand divorce rate spiked to 17.9 in 1982 (Statistics NZ, 2014c), when couples previously 
blocked from divorcing could fulfil the two-year separation requirements of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, while the Australian CDR spiked to 4.5 in 1976 in the wake of the 
Family Law Act 1975 (with a one-year separation requirement). These spikes were not 
permanent, however, and divorce rates have declined slowly since the 1980s; the Australian 
CDR fell to 2.2 in 2012 (ABS, 2013), the American CDR fell to 3.6 in 2011 (CDC, 2013c), 
and the New Zealand rate of divorce per 1,000 marriages fell to 9.4 in 2013 (Statistics NZ, 
2014c). 
Cleavages 
National-level patterns in relation formation and exit do not reflect the deep diversity 
present within each country. Not only do different age groups display different relationship 
patterns, but these patterns also differ across ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and geography. 
In Australia, for example, the Northern Territory CMR has stood well below that of the rest 
of Australia since 1962, while its residents have been much more likely to form de facto 
relationships; in 1991, when the Territory passed its De Facto Relationships Act, 18.5% of 
couples were de facto relationships, more than twice the figure for the country as a whole 
(ABS, 1997, p. 25). 
America displays an immense variety not only of CMRs and CDRs, but of CMR and 
CDR trends. West Virginia marriage and divorce rates have remained static between 1990 
and 2011, while the South Carolina CMR dropped by 55% over the same period, and the 
Arizona CDR dropped 43%. While the Arkansas CMR has dropped 32%, it remains at 10.4 
(the highest outside the destination wedding states of Hawaiʻi and Nevada (CDC, 2013a, 
2013b). 
There are striking differences between the relationship formation patterns of 
indigenous and non-indigenous New Zealanders and Australians. Māori and Aboriginal 
Australians are both less likely to be partnered and more likely, if they are partnered, to be in 
a de facto relationship (ABS, 2011; Statistics NZ, 2013). This may be partially explained by 
the different age profiles of indigenous and non-indigenous groups, but Māori are also more 
likely than Pākehā to form de facto relationships across every age bracket from age 20. In 
part these differences may be cultural; Heard (2011, p. 134) suggests that the role of 
“community-sanctioned consensual unions” explains the differences, and Ruru (2005, p. 330) 
points out that the formalities surrounding pre-European Māori “marriages” could vary 
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considerably, and did not have the same implications for property rights as European 
marriage. 
There is a similar ethnic divide in the United States. Elliott et al. (2012) show that, 
while black Americans were more likely to be married than white Americans prior to the 
post-war marriage boom, this has now reversed, and black women in particular are much less 
likely to marry than white women. Like Heard, Elliott et al. suggest that there are cultural 
explanations for this, such as the greater importance of extended families in black society, 
greater acceptance of non-marital parenting, and low levels of trust in low-income 
communities that discourage marriage. They also identify the substantially higher 
imprisonment rate for black men as a factor. 
Differences in relationship formation across ethnic divides may also relate to 
differences along socioeconomic divides, as marriage is becoming increasingly associated 
with economic security. Heard (2011, p. 125) points out that increasing cohabitation rates are 
not primarily the result of educated women shunning marriage. Sassler & Miller (2011, p. 
163) found that, in America, the proportion of high-school-educated women who had 
cohabited at some point grew at over twice the rate of university-educated women between 
1987 and 2002. 
Heard (2011) found a similar effect in Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand. 
While educated Australian women have held liberal attitudes toward marriage for some time 
(English & King, 1983, p. 36), these attitudes appear to have resulted in deferring, rather than 
rejecting marriage, while the least educated women are now unlikely to marry. This trend 
makes sense within the newly neoliberalised economies of Australia and New Zealand where, 
without the guarantees of full employment or the family wage, unskilled men make poor 
prospective partners for low-income women, for whom they may become a burden rather 
than a source of stability. At the same time, the growing influence of egalitarian views of 
marriage mean that highly qualified women can expect their partners to view them as equals 
within marriage.  
KEY INSTITUTIONS 
Because there are significant differences in how relationships policies have changed 
despite similar demographic changes, it is important to examine the differences in the 
decision-making processes through which these demographic changes are interpreted. 
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Electoral systems 
Electoral systems are a core source of variations in opportunities for interests. The 
different electoral systems in each country, in combination with party structures, shape the 
makeup of legislatures and the balance of power between individual legislators and political 
parties. Both the United States and Australia operate federal systems with bicameral 
legislatures (with a few exceptions at state and territory level), but the electoral systems in 
each country function very differently. While New Zealand has a unitary government, and 
unicameral legislature, its electoral system and party structures share similarities to those of 
Australia. 
While the United States uses a single-member, first-past-the-post (FPP) system, 
Australia uses a combination of single-member and multi-member preferential systems for its 
lower and upper houses respectively. While single-member systems tend to disadvantage 
third parties, because they reward local, rather than broad-based support, the existence of a 
preference system does at least allow voters to identify their “true” preference without fear of 
vote wastage. The multi-member electorates for upper houses in Australia provide more 
substantial opportunities for minor parties, which regularly hold the balance of power, forcing 
major parties to build policy coalitions with minor parties to pass legislation. New Zealand 
moved from FPP to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system following a referendum in 
1993. MMP in New Zealand entitles parties to representation in proportion to their 
nationwide “party vote”, provided that they win at least 5% of the party vote or one of a 
number of local electorates (determined by FPP). This system gives minor parties access to 
Parliament, and forces major parties to negotiate with them to form a government or pass 
legislation, but the entrance thresholds may block potential entrants and dissuade voters from 
selecting a party that may not achieve the threshold. 
The United States uses a primary system for candidate selection, which produces very 
different results to the internal party mechanisms employed in Australia and New Zealand. 
The primary system is a “democratised” form of candidate selection that allows the voters of 
an electoral district to select their preferred candidate rather than allowing a local or national 
party organisation to make this decision. Mayer (2001, p. 12014) points out that this weakens 
these party organisations and enables “outsider” candidates to win elections. Moreover, the 
local focus of selection provides an incentive for representatives to play to the preferences of 
their electorates, rather than to those of the wider party, so it may be difficult for the leaders 
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of a governing party to enact controversial aspects of their agenda, even if they theoretically 
control both chambers of a state or federal legislature and its executive. 
By contrast, the major parties of Australia and New Zealand use internal selection 
processes that rely, depending on the party and type of election at hand, on some combination 
of fee-paying party members and party officials (Crook, 2009a, 2009b; NZLP, 2014, sec. 
301–366; NZNP, 2013, sec. 86–134). This means that political parties in Australia and New 
Zealand exercise a great deal of influence over their representatives. Farrell & McAllister 
(2006, pp. 132–133), commenting on Australian senate selection procedures, point out that 
candidates who are suspected of being less than completely loyal to their party – or even to a 
powerful faction within their party – may move down their party’s list or lose their place 
altogether. Internal selection allows egalitarian parties to enforce affirmative action policies, 
although how effectively these policies work may depend on how the specific rules at hand 
interact with the electoral system; the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) has not been able 
to achieve its gender equality targets because of poor party vote results (Strongman, 2014). 
Labo(u)r parties also require their candidates to sign a pledge to act collectively (Brett, 2003, 
p. 41; NZLP, 2014, sec. 300), giving the party organisation further control over its members’ 
actions within Parliament.  
Citizen & stakeholder participation 
There are a number of formal and informal mechanisms for interested parties to 
participate in policy-making processes outside elections. In all three countries legislative 
committee hearings provide an opportunity for citizens and organisations to testify about 
policy. Citizens may also participate in, and in some circumstances instigate referenda. There 
are, however, strong differences between the countries in the effectiveness and openness of 
these forms of participation. 
Referenda 
Referenda in New Zealand and Australia may be either binding or non-binding, 
depending on their circumstances. In New Zealand, Parliament may initiate a binding 
referendum, usually on a constitutionally significant issue such as the electoral system, but 
this occurs very rarely (Morris, 2004, p. 117; Preston, 1997). Otherwise, a large number of 
citizens may sign a petition to call for a non-binding referendum; the Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Act 1993 requires petitioners to collect signatures from 10% of the electoral roll 
(300,400 signatures at 20 July 2014) (Morris, 2004, p. 122; NZEC, 2014). This necessitates 
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significant organisational efforts to bring issues to a vote, and nothing requires the 
government to take the public’s decision into account. Calls for binding citizen-initiated 
referenda have been led largely by conservative and populist parties (Conservative Party, 
2014; Kiwi Party, 2008; New Zealand First, 2008), indicating that these parties believe that 
their agendas are compromised by Parliamentary supremacy. New Zealand relationships 
policies have not been directly affected by referenda, although New Zealand First called for 
binding referenda on civil unions and same-sex marriage (D. Jones, 2004a; W. Peters, 2013). 
Australia uses binding referenda principally in deciding constitutional issues; the 
powers of the federal government are dictated by the federal constitution, which may only be 
changed by referendum (Kildea & Williams, 2010, p. 22). While state referenda have 
reasonable success rates, federal referenda usually fail, and none has passed since 1977, 
which has forced the federal government to turn to agreements from state parliaments to 
expand its powers (Williams & Hume, 2010, pp. 101–102). While there is no guarantee that 
the federal government would have acted more quickly on de facto relationships policy 
without this requirement, the absence of authority to act in this area created a space for state 
governments to act. 
Referenda play an even greater role in the United States, where they are usually 
required to approve state constitutional amendments. Although the precise requirements 
involved in proposing an amendment vary between states, many states rely on citizens’ 
petitions, allowing well-organised interest groups a mechanism for shaping the behaviour of 
state legislatures and courts. Dinan (2011, p. 1014) points out that state amendments are 
important to actors concerned about preserving a policy from future legislators; this makes 
the process particularly useful for conservative actors, including same-sex marriage 
opponents. This is confirmed by Haider-Markel (2003, p. 443), although changing attitudes 
toward same-sex marriage may mean that direct democracy is no longer such a serious threat 
to LGBT rights. 
Committees and inquiries 
Formal committee hearings also play a role in the political systems of each country, 
giving stakeholders an opportunity to deliver their opinions to politicians, particularly on bills 
before the legislature. However, opportunities to participate are not necessarily distributed 
evenly amongst stakeholders. While select committees in New Zealand and Australia receive 
written and oral submissions from the general public (Department of the Senate, 2014; New 
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Zealand Parliament, 2012), federal legislative committees in the United States are more 
selective in calling witnesses (Catholic Health Association, n.d.), generally relying on 
lobbyists and “experts” (Schultz & Vile, 2005). The logistical requirements of attending a 
congressional hearing may exclude vulnerable potential witnesses. Ultimately, however, there 
is no requirement for a committee in any country to genuinely engage with citizen and 
stakeholder testimony. 
Some areas of family law are dealt with by extra-parliamentary bodies such as law 
commissions. These institutions, which exist in New Zealand  (NZLC, 2014), Australia 
(ALRC, 2014) and its states (NSWLRC, 2013), and a number of American states (including 
California and Connecticut (CALRC, 2014; CTLRC, 2014a)), are bodies of legal experts that 
investigate possibilities for legal modernisation in areas appointed by governments or 
legislatures. While law commissions attempt to engage in public consultation, they focus 
particularly on the legal community (ALRC, 1987, pp. 6–7; NZLC, 1997, pp. 3–5, 171–172). 
American commissions are both less prevalent and less independent than those in Australia 
and New Zealand. While commissions in Australia and New Zealand generally consist of 
leading law practitioners and academics, American commissions include elected legislators 
and political appointees (the Michigan commission, for example, includes two senators, two 
representatives, and four members appointed by a joint committee (Michigan Legislative 
Council, 2014). 
Judicial review 
Judicial review of legislative and administrative decisions is considerably more 
prevalent in the United States than either New Zealand (where it is almost impossible) or 
Australia. Because New Zealand lacks a clearly-defined and entrenched constitution, its 
courts lack the power to rule legislation incompatible with the rights and freedoms accorded 
to individuals and governments. The Australian constitution lacks a bill of rights, so petitions 
by individuals against legislation that disregards their perceived rights and freedoms have 
little basis. The constitution does, however, identify the powers of the federal government, so 
federal legislation that goes beyond these powers or state legislation that trespasses upon the 
powers of the federal government may be subject to judicial review. 
United States courts participate in policy processes on a significant scale, potentially 
determining both the legitimacy of policies, and their implementation (Kagan, 2004). Both 
federal and state constitutions in the United States contain bills of rights, so it is possible for 
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people to petition either federal or state courts on the basis of these rights being violated, or 
on the basis of a government exceeding its authority. Consequently, actors may engage in 
judicial level-switching, changing their focus from state courts to federal courts and vice 
versa to exploit differences between federal and state constitutions and the attitudes of the 
judicial systems (Hodder-Williams, 2003, p. 152). The availability of judicial review works 
against legal discrimination, and is difficult for pro-traditionalists to exploit if they are 
seeking to constrict rights, but it cannot serve a thorough pro-egalitarian agenda as on its own 
it is incapable of disestablishing institutions or creating new ones to compete with 
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CHAPTER 4: NEW ZEALAND 
RELATIONSHIP ENTRANCE AND DEFINITION 
MARRIAGE 
New Zealand’s Marriage Act 1955 governs the process of marrying. The Act 
identifies who may legally marry and establishes license issuance and solemnisation 
processes. The Act did not originally specify the sex of those marrying, relying on the 
unstated assumption that marriage was a heterosexual relationship. The Christian Coalition’s 
1996 manifesto (contemporary with America’s Defence of Marriage Act) proposed defining 
marriage as “the legal contract of two people of the opposite sex committed to a life-long 
loving relationship” (Christian Coalition, 1996, p. 8), but their failure to reach the electoral 
threshold removed the potential for this to become part of a post-election agreement. 
Consequently, the first definition of marriage in the Act came from the Marriage (Definition 
of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, which defined marriage as the “union of 2 people, 
regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity”. 
The Marriage Act does not explicitly enforce monogamy, but the Crimes Act 1961 (s. 
205-206) criminalises bigamy, with a potential sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment, 
covering marriages within New Zealand and, for citizens and usual residents, marriages 
overseas. However, polygamous marriages contracted legally elsewhere before migrating to 
New Zealand are fully recognised.  
Marriages involving minors (16-17; 16-19 until 2005) require the consent of parents 
or guardians (Marriage Act, 1955, s. 17-20). Although the Status of Children Act 1969 
eliminated the language of “legitimacy” from the Act, a young person’s parents’ marital 
status remains a factor in determining whose consent is valid and necessary for the marriage. 
In certain circumstances, the necessity of a father’s consent depends on whether he had ever 
married the mother of the young person in question. This subtly acknowledges the 
“traditionalist” view that marriage carries the presumption of paternity (Baskerville, 2006, p. 
61). However, if a minor’s parents cohabit or they live with only one parent, relationship 
status is irrelevant in determining who must consent. 
The Marriage Act also provides a framework for the ceremonial or sacramental 
aspects of marriage. While marriage is legally a contract between two people and the State, 
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the involvement of representatives of community organisation and religious bodies in 
conducting marriages acknowledges the place of civil society and religion in marriage 
(Marriage Act 1955, s. 7-14A). The Act also acknowledges the religious practices of Quakers 
(and, following the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001, other groups with similar attitudes 
toward religious leadership), exempting them from the requirement for an approved celebrant 
or registrar (Marriage Act 1955, s. 14A, 32). 
Celebrants became a subject of debate over the Marriage Amendment Act 2013, 
which presented the question of whether celebrants could refuse to conduct same-sex 
marriages if this would violate their personal beliefs. Celebrants discriminating against 
homosexual couples would potentially violate the Human Rights Act 1993, particularly given 
that they operate on the State’s behalf. The legislation’s sponsor argued that s. 29, which 
states that marriage licenses do not oblige celebrants to perform marriages, provided 
sufficient protection (Wall, 2013, p. 8524). The committee reviewing the Bill nevertheless 
adopted a specific exemption for celebrants representing organisations opposed to same-sex 
marriage. 
CIVIL UNIONS 
The Civil Union Act 2004 (CUA), which created civil unions, mirrors the processes 
of the Marriage Act almost exactly. When introduced, the CUA offered formal recognition 
and protection for homosexual couples on an (approximately) equal basis to marriage, and an 
alternative status for heterosexual couples seeking state recognition without traditional 
connotations. The Marriage Act 2013 further reduced the legal distinctions between the 
relationships, although some minor differences highlight civil unions’ “deinstitutionalised” 
character. 
The first such difference is in the processes for allowing civil unions and marriages 
within the “prohibited degrees of affinity” (CUA, 2004, s. 10; Marriage Act 1955, s. 15). The 
Acts forbid people marrying or entering civil unions with close blood relations
2
  or (by 
default) the former spouse or civil union partner of an ancestor or descendant. The latter 
barrier may be waived more simply for a civil union. The Marriage Act allows the High 
Court to waive the barrier provided that the couple’s conduct did not contribute to 
terminating either party’s marriage. This deters infidelity and other potentially relationship-
destroying behaviour by withholding the sanction of marriage, although its limited 
                                                 
2
 Cousin-marriages are acceptable. 
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application means that it principally defends parent-child relationships, rather than marriage 
itself. The CUA requires a Family Court application and offers no grounds for refusal. This 
marks marriage as a more exclusive institution with higher standard of commitment and 
fidelity, but also undercuts the Marriage Act’s practical effect as couples may receive equal 
treatment by “only” contracting civil unions. In governing consent to the union of minors, the 
CUA (s. 19-20) also replaces the veiled legitimacy language of the Marriage Act with a 
functionalist focus on guardianship. 
The solemnisation of civil unions highlights their deinstitutionalised character. 
Whereas marriage celebrants may operate due to their standing within an approved 
community organisation or religious body, civil union celebrants hold their status in their 
own right, although this may be related to the “interests of the public generally, or of a 
particular community” (CUA, 2004, s. 26). This reinforces the idea that civil unions are a 
private affair unconnected to the practices and beliefs of traditional institutions. This 
deinstitutionalised character has not proved attractive to New Zealanders; only nine couples 
have transitioned from marriage to civil union (61 heterosexual couples have done the 
opposite) (Statistics NZ, 2014a), indicating that their openness to heterosexual couples was 
not the result of a great groundswell of public desire to escape marriage. 
DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS 
The beginning of a de facto relationship is less clearly defined than that of a marriage 
or civil union. The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA)
3
 (which is principally concerned 
with relationship exit) and Interpretation Act 1999
4
 determine the existence of de facto 
relationships for different purposes, using different sets of criteria. 
While each Act attempts to provide a functional definition of de facto relationships, 
and leaves substantial room for courts’ or administrators’ interpretations, the PRA provides a 
more concrete mechanism for determining whether de facto relationships exist. Under the 
PRA, a relationship between any two people is a de facto relationship if it involves two adults 
who “live together as a couple… and who are not married to, or in a civil union with, one 
                                                 
3
 Following the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001. 
4
 Following the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 and associated Acts. 
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another” (PRA, 1976, s. 2D(1)). Section 2D(2) provides criteria that courts may use to 
determine whether people “live together as a couple”5. 
In its initial stages, the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (RSRB) utilised the 
definition and criteria of the PRA in its amendments to the Interpretation Act. However, the 
eventual collection of Acts derived from the RSRB replaced this definition by defining a de 
facto relationship as two people living together “as a couple in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage or civil union” (Interpretation Act 1999, s. 29A). It eliminated the specific 
functional criteria specified by the PRA, allowing interpreters to determine whether a 
relationship exists by considering “all the circumstances of the relationship” and the context 
and purpose of the law under which the determination is necessary. Consequently, while the 
Interpretation Act 1999 allows courts and administrators to treat relationships on a functional 
basis, it also points to a normative model of how a relationship should operate. 
Proponents of the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 (PRAA) and RSRB 
primarily employed justice- and rights-based arguments, while opponents used liberal 
arguments based on freedom of choice and conservative arguments focused on protecting the 
“institution of marriage”. In introducing the RSRB, Labour’s David Benson-Pope (2004, p. 
13951) argued that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 
compelled the state to stop discriminating between relationships that shared the core 
characteristics of being “committed, exclusive, and stable”, while Green MP Metiria Turei 
(2004, p. 13957) supported the RSRB because it would correct injustices experienced by 
sexual minorities. 
Opponents suggested that these laws would decrease the likelihood of people entering 
traditional marriage by eliminating its legal advantages, and that the absence of a 
commitment to permanence meant that de facto relationships were not functionally equal in 
any case (N. Smith, 2004). Others suggested that the RSRB would eliminate couples’ right to 
live without the rights and responsibilities of marriage (Franks, 2004, p. 13958; D. Jones, 
2004b, p. 13956). Jenny Shipley (2000, p. 6706) used a similar argument about merging the 
matrimonial and de facto property regimes in the PRAA, suggesting that the government was 
“marrying 236,397 people” through the bill. 
                                                 
5
 Including duration, cohabitation, sexual intimacy, financial dependence or interdependence, property 
“ownership, use, and acquisition”, mutual commitment, children, household labour-sharing, and public 
recognition as a couple. 
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 RELATIONSHIP EXIT  
The PRA and FPA govern the process of leaving a relationship in New Zealand, in 
order to minimise conflict and achieve just outcomes for partners post-separation. 
Property division 
When first enacted, the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (later the PRA) dramatically 
advanced the role of gender equality as a principle in dividing relationship property. Judges 
formerly exercised discretion in recognising nonfinancial contributions to marriages when 
making property determinations, with uneven results (Atkin et al., 2013, p. 662). 
Consequently, women were often severely financially disadvantaged by divorces. The 
Matrimonial Property Act established a principle of equal division (not equal outcomes) 
through a “50-50 split on a clean break, no fault principle” (Tolley, 2001, p. 8629). 
Besides protecting women from the consequences of divorce, the Act also served to 
promote marriage as the ideal family form. The Act covered only legally-contracted 
marriages, leaving de facto couples and Māori customary marriages unprotected. Henaghan 
& Tapp (1992, pp. 23–24) attribute the exclusive focus on marriage to the change of 
government between the introduction and passage of the Matrimonial Property Bill. The 
Third Labour Government, which introduced the Bill in 1975, supported protection for de 
facto relationships but lost that year’s election. National’s Minister of Justice David Thomson 
favoured limiting protection to legal marriage to encourage people to demonstrate their 
responsibility to their partner by marrying (Henaghan & Tapp, 1992, p. 24). 
The PRAA changed the principle behind property division. While equality remains a 
core value of the PRA, the amendments changed the nature of this equality. The Act now 
focuses on equality of outcomes rather than equality of division. Its principles (PRA, 1976, s. 
1N) begin from the idea that “men and women have equal status, and that equality should be 
maintained and enhanced”. The Act acknowledges that the division of labour within a 
relationship affects partners’ financial situations beyond the course of the relationship. A 
“just division of property” under the Act’s principles compensates for the “economic 
advantages and disadvantages” that accrue through the relationship. This may include 
compensating partners for their career sacrifices or their role in promoting their partner’s 
career. Consequently, the PRAA was a significant egalitarian step, attempting to deconstruct 
structural inequality. The amendments certainly exceeded those envisioned by National in its 
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long-delayed response to a 1988 working group; National’s proposed amendments chiefly 
sought to remedy a different inequity: differences in property division at divorce and at death 
(Vernon, 2000, pp. 833–834). 
Parliamentary debate on this aspect of the amendments highlighted a perceived trade-
off between the values of justice and expediency. Margaret Wilson (2001, p. 8625) portrayed 
the 50-50 split as a potentially unjust solution that perpetuated “systemic unfairness”, and 
Matt Robson (2001, p. 8629) argued that the amendments “balance[d] the real impact of the 
structure of the labour market”. National representatives, however, argued that these 
amendments would provoke litigation, reducing the Family Court’s efficiency and 
exacerbating tensions between former partners at the expense of their families (Ryall, 2001, 
pp. 8626–8627). 
The PRAA also promoted equality between relationship forms by extending the 
concept of relationship property to de facto relationships (and, following the CUA, to civil 
unions as well), offering formal protection to de facto partners adversely affected by the 
division of labour, income and assets in their relationships. This aspect of the PRAA, which 
combined two bills introduced by National prior to its election defeat, drew fire from 
National MP Lynda Scott (2001, p. 8632), who sought to preserve marriage as a “different 
and special status” and the “founding social arrangement of our society”. National had 
proposed a separate but near-equal regime for de facto couples (excluding same-sex couples). 
Supporters of excluding same-sex relationships argued that, as the bill characterised de facto 
relationships as relationships in the nature of marriage, including same-sex relationships 
would be tantamount to recognising same-sex marriage (Kyd, 1998; Schnauer, 1998). 
Labour’s legislation not only treated de facto relationships and marriages similarly, but had 
also attempted to equalise the status of relationships by dropping references to marriage from 
the legislation, which were reintroduced following public unease (Tolley, 2001, p. 8630). 
The focus on minimising status stratification within the PRA also has implications for 
relationship entrance. For the Act’s purposes, neither marriage nor civil union actually begins 
at the point of their solemnisation or celebration, but includes any immediately-preceding de 
facto relationship, marriage or civil union between the couple in question (PRA, 1976, s. 2B-
2BA). This responds to changing patterns of transition into marriage, but at the expense of 
assuming that such transitions involve nothing more than a status change, where they may 
also indicate functional changes. 
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De facto partners’ rights and responsibilities do remain somewhat differentiated from 
those of civil union partners or spouses. The Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA) provides 
for the payment of maintenance between formers partners to meet their needs under certain 
conditions (FPA, 1980, s. 6, 66(2)), yet only spouses or civil union partners have a right to 
maintenance during their relationship (FPA, 1980, s. 63). The FPA thus assumes that 
financial interdependence should exist within marriages, but not necessarily within de facto 
relationships, which clashes somewhat with the role of de facto relationships in the social 
security system, which presumes that de facto partners are interdependent (Social Security 
Act 1964, s. 3), allowing the government to reduce its financial obligations. 
Separation and dissolution 
The FPA governs the dissolution of marriages and civil unions. At its introduction, 
the Act altered marriage policy significantly by replacing the grounds under which courts 
could order divorces with the single, no-fault ground of irreconcilable breakdown, satisfied 
only by a couple living apart for at least two years, which one or both spouses may prove by 
producing a separation agreement or separation order (FPA, 1980, s. 39). 
Despite its abandonment of pro-traditionalist, fault-based approaches to divorce that 
require proof of adultery, abandonment, or similar breaches of an idealised form of marriage, 
the FPA required a mildly interventionist approach for the state. The themes of 
“reconciliation” and “conciliation” ran throughout, with all legal actors and counsellors 
involved in relationship disputes called to promote them wherever possible (FPA, 1980 [as 
enacted], s. 8, 12). Troubled couples could request counselling from the Family Court before 
entering formal proceedings. The Court had a duty to refer couples to counselling when they 
applied for separation orders and could adjourn proceedings for counselling when 
reconciliation appeared possible (FPA, 1980 [as enacted], s. 9-10, 19). The Family 
Proceedings Amendment Act 1994 introduced sections 12A and 12B, providing public 
funding for this counselling. 
The promotion of reconciliation rests on an assumption that relationships should, 
ideally, be lifelong, and that genuine public interest exists in fostering this understanding (at 
an institutional level) and preserving individual relationships (at a personal level). The FPA 
required a relatively low level of functioning; reconciliation meant only that couples resumed 
their relationship, and the relationship would thereafter be their private affair. Conciliation, 
meanwhile, accepts a breakdown in form and attempts to reconstruct a level of function 
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sufficient only to settle property and custody matters. By prioritising reconciliation, the FPA 
sent the message that preserving couple relationships was preferable to splintering and re-
partnering except in extreme cases. 
However, a parcel of Acts passed in late 2013 removed the concept of reconciliation 
from the FPA. The Family Proceedings Amendment Act (No. 2) 2013 removed the Act’s 
dispute resolution procedures, eliminating the right to free counselling and the responsibilities 
of professionals to promote reconciliation. This effectively changed the ground for divorce; 
where the previous system tested whether relationships were actually broken through 
counselling and legal actors efforts (however superficial), the FPA now assumes that one 
party’s desires and the passage of time are sufficient evidence of irreconcilable breakdown. 
Indeed, the new Family Court structure positions parent-child relationships as the only 
relationships worth protecting. The changes replaced the previous counselling and mediation 
services with “Family Dispute Resolution”, which covers only childcare arrangements and 
property division (Ministry of Justice, 2014, p. 2). While participants may access some 
counselling prior to Family Dispute Resolution, this is not relationship counselling as such; 
rather, its purpose is to help parents to refocus their attention from their relationship to their 
children. 
The National government based its case for focusing on a more limited range of 
interventions not on ideological aversion to government intervention in relationships, but on 
administrative efficiency. The regulatory impact statement identified an “urgent” need to 
lower the costs of the justice system, the unsuitability of some matters for judicial processes, 
and the “delays and expense” caused by Family Court processes (Ministry of Justice, 2012, 
pp. 1, 3). The government’s focus lay in a target approach that “emphasis[ed] the needs of 
children and vulnerable people” (Collins, 2013, p. 11536). The Ministry of Justice (2012, p. 
9) identified the elimination of relationship counselling as a means of freeing $9.7m for 
vulnerable cases. 
The amendments further the concept that relationships are essentially private affairs 
rather than expressions of a public institution. National’s Scott Simpson (2013, p. 13565) 
described the changes in language evoking the principle of subsidiarity, arguing that 
“recourse to State-provided services and facilities should not be a course of first action for 
people who are going through relationship breakups”. The trigger for state intervention is set 
at a very high level of relationship dysfunction – the level at which there appears to be no 
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possibility of the relationship continuing. The National government acknowledges no 
responsibility to reinforce traditional assumptions of permanence, even on the basis that this 
might prevent the need for intervention on behalf of children or vulnerable people. The most 
apparently “conservative” voice in the debate came not from conservative elements of the 
New Zealand National Party (NZNP) (who could not realistically criticise government 
legislation, given the strong party unity promoted by MMP), but from Green MP Jan Logie. 
 “This legislation is what happens when the Government forgets that 
it has an important role to play in preventing social disintegration.” 
Jan Logie (2013, p. 13568) 
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CHAPTER 5: AUSTRALIA 
RELATIONSHIP ENTRANCE AND DEFINITION 
MARRIAGE 
The Australian Constitution determines where relationships policy development 
occurs because it limits the Commonwealth’s responsibilities in the area to marriage, divorce, 
“matrimonial causes”, and related childcare matters (Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900, s. 51(xxi-xxii)). Before the Marriage Act 1961, the states and 
territories set their own marriage laws which conflicted on matters such as the age of 
marriage and in some cases prevented indigenous Australians from marrying
6
 (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, 2012, pp. 9–10). 
The Marriage Act (like that of New Zealand) controls eligibility to marry and the process of 
solemnisation (although states have some freedom to govern marriage registration (Marriage 
Act 1961, s. 6). 
The Act originally endorsed the pattern of women marrying younger than men. 
Women could marry with parental permission at 14, and without permission at 16, in each 
case two years younger than men (Marriage Act, 1961, s. 11-21 [as enacted]).This promoted 
“traditional” marriage by endorsing a situation in which teenagers with few qualifications and 
little experience could marry into dependent relationships with older men. The Sex 
Discrimination Amendment Act 1991 eventually eliminated this discrepancy, and replaced 
gendered references to “the man” or “the woman” with the generic “1 party”. These changes 
were uncontentious, though their evidential basis is intriguing. Minister Robert Brown
7
 
(1991, p. 1416) depicted the change as not simply a matter of correcting discrimination, but 
as part of a worldwide trend towards a single marriageable age, and acknowledged an 
Attorney General’s department survey of marriage counselling and education professionals as 
the source of the new age. 
                                                 
6
 The Advisory report on the Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2012 and Marriage Amendment Bill 2012 by 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs (2012, p. 10) found that 
Victoria’s Aborigines Protection Act 1869 allowed the Board for the Protection of Aborigines to refuse the 
marriage applications of indigenous Victorians, and that Queensland’s Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of 
the Sale of Opium Act 1897 required indigenous women to get permission before marrying a non-indigenous 
man. 
7
 Acting for the Attorney General, Michael Duffy. 
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Marriage celebrants and solemnisation 
The Marriage Act (pt. IV div. 1) allows people to register as celebrants either in their 
own right, as civil servants, or as “ministers of religion”. The Act presumes that religious 
leaders put forward by recognised organisations are qualified. The Marriage Amendment Act 
2002 refined the appointment of civil celebrants. Candidates must prove that they are 
appropriately qualified and a “fit and proper person” for the role (Marriage Act 1961, s. 
39C(1)). The criteria to prove fitness are a weak form of the priorities of the marital 
improvement movement (Doherty & Anderson, 2004, pp. 426–427). Candidates commit to 
informing couples about relationship support services and engage in professional 
development (Marriage Act 1961, ss. 39C(2), 29G). Australian celebrants do not yet face the 
question of whether to celebrate same-sex marriages, but religious celebrants may refuse to 
solemnise any marriage and impose additional conditions on prospective couples (s. 47). No 
equivalent privileges exist for civil celebrants. 
Civil and religious ceremonies also have different requirements (Marriage Act 1961 s. 
45). Religious celebrants may use forms appropriate to their organisation, but civil 
ceremonies must include a standardised declaration (or variation thereupon) and a statement 
outlining the nature of marriage. Unless using a Ministerially-approved ceremony, civil 
celebrants must declare the following or a variation, 
… I am to remind you of the solemn and binding nature of the relationship 
into which you are now about to enter. Marriage, according to law in 
Australia, is the union of a man a woman to the exclusion of all others, 
voluntarily entered into for life. 
Marriage Act, 1961, s. 46(b) 
Civil marriage ceremonies in Australia are not simply the signing of a contract between two 
people, but act to reinforce the criteria of fidelity and permanence in how the public 
understands marriage. The words are not only for the exclusive benefit of the marrying 
couple, but also for those witnessing the ceremony. They attempt to preserve marriage as a 
particular form of relationship, rather than just a legal status. 
Same-sex marriage 
The Marriage Act originally implied that marriage was exclusively heterosexual 
without explicitly identifying it. The Howard government “corrected” this through the 
Marriage Amendment Act 2004, which defined marriage as “the union of a man and a 
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woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life” (Marriage Act 1961, s. 
5(1)) and prohibited the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages (s. 88EA). The Coalition 
presented the legislation as a response to the “possible erosion of the institution of marriage” 
(Ruddock, 2004, p. 31559). It was prompted by other countries’ recognition of same-sex 
marriage, which potentially allowed Australians to contract same-sex marriages overseas and 
demand that the government recognise them on their return. Although the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) supported the legislation, spokesperson Nicola Roxon (2004) argued that the 
Coalition had manufactured the “crisis”. Emerging as an urgent issue – like the American 
Defence of Marriage Act – in an election year, the Marriage Amendment Act may be seen as 
electoral populism. However, Murray (2010, pp. 242–244) points out that concern with the 
erosion of traditional institutions constituted a fundamental element of Howard’s political 
philosophy. 
Green senators introduced a series of same-sex marriage bills in response, but none 
gained parliamentary traction until the 2011 ALP conference voted to endorse same-sex 
marriage, but allow their representatives to exercise a conscience vote on the matter 
(Packham, 2011). The conference debate exposed divisions between and within ALP 
factions, with some same-sex marriage supporters opposing a conscience vote on the grounds 
that the vote was a matter of “human rights”. Catholic “Right” faction members Joe de Bruyn 
and Hellen Polley argued from a traditionalist perspective to maintain the definition that had 
“been used for centuries” (ABC News, 2011); de Bruyn suggested that the decision might 
threaten Labor’s chances in marginal seats. ALP MP Stephen Jones introduced a Marriage 
Amendment Bill in 2012; with a divided ALP and Liberal Party of Australia (LPA) members 
denied a conscience vote, the bill lost 42-98 in the House. 
The Commonwealth’s right to regulate marriage prevents policy level-switching in 
the area. The ACT Labor government, whose Deputy Chief Minister moved the ALP 
conference motion (Packham, 2011), passed the Marriage Equality (Same-Sex) Act 2013, 
which mirrored the processes of the Marriage Act 1961 and Family Law Act 1975 (FLA). 
Tony Abbott’s newly elected Coalition government challenged the Act’s legality in the High 
Court of Australia, which deemed it inconsistent with the Marriage Act 1961 (High Court of 
Australia, 2013) and, in consequence, invalid. 
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NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The Commonwealth may regulate non-marital relationships only when the states 
accord them this power, as the Constitution does not identify it as a subject of federal 
intervention. New South Wales passed Australia’s first de facto relationships protections in 
1984. The De Facto Relationships Act 1984 defined the relationships as “relationship[s] of 
living or having lived together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis although 
not married to each other”, a definition based on social security legislation (Unsworth, 1984, 
p. 2692)). While courts offered common-law marriages some protection beforehand, the Act 
attempted to standardise these marriages’ treatment and offer some prospect of an equitable 
distribution of property in the event of a breakdown (Harrison, 1991). 
Though other states and territories followed New South Wales with their own de facto 
property legislation, the treatment of de facto relationships was not standardised until the 
Rudd government passed the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other 
Measures) Act 2008. Labor avoided explicitly relating de facto relationships to marriage; the 
Act defined de facto relationships as couples “living together on a genuine domestic basis8, 
established by criteria
9
 almost identical to those of New Zealand’s PRA. Australia added state 
regulation as a possible qualification while omitting “the performance of household duties10. 
States made a number of changes in how they recognised de facto relationships 
between 1984 and 2008, shaping and delaying the eventual federal law. A 2002 state 
Attorneys-General conference agreed to authorise the Commonwealth to legislate on de facto 
relationship property (Perrett, 2008, pp. 6526–7), as had already occurred for dealing with 
childcare arrangements. Ex-partners with children were forced to work through two separate 
court systems to settle their affairs. Policy-makers noted the unsuitability of state courts for 
de facto property affairs as early as 1991, when a Northern Territory legislator suggested in 
debating the Territory’s de facto property legislation that the Family Court would be the 
appropriate venue (Hickey, 1991, p. 1385). Despite the dual systems causing unnecessary 
distress for former couples, and the Howard government’s supposed co-operation with the 
Attorneys-General, the discrepancy remained unresolved throughout the Howard 
government. 
                                                 
8
 The Family Law Amendment Act 1991 which expanded the Family Court mandate over childcare disputes to 
cohabitants, instituted the “genuine domestic basis” wording, but retained a common-law marriage association 
(s. 4). 
9
 Duration, cohabitation, sexual intimacy, “financial dependence or interdependence”, property, “mutual 
commitment”, children, and public reputation. 
10
 New South Wales and Western Australia included this criterion in 1999 and 2002 respectively. 
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Same-sex de facto relationships 
The Coalition’s unwillingness to introduce promised federal legislation stemmed 
primarily from opposition to protecting same-sex de facto relationships, rather than 
opposition to the general concept of de facto relationships. Although most state de facto 
relationships legislation passed between 1984 and 2008 was championed by Labor 
governments
11
, many of these bills enjoyed significant Liberal support, and right-wing 
governments introduced legislation for the Northern Territory and South Australia. In each 
case, Liberal proponents advocated for clear property division laws primarily on the basis of 
simplicity – a non-interventionist construction – rather than equality (Manzie, 1991, p. 1058). 
The ACT Domestic Relationships Act 1994 provided the first protections for same-
sex couples. Its proponents did not, however, trumpet it as a revolution in the treatment of 
same-sex couples. The Act defined domestic relationships as “personal relationship[s] 
between 2 adults in which 1 provides personal or financial commitment and support of a 
domestic nature for the material benefit of the other”. Thus it identified the functions of care, 
support and (inter)dependence as worthy of government protection, rather than sexuality. 
Terry Connolly (1994, p. 1119) argued that his bill would contribute to “equity and 
convenience”, and that restricting “domestic relationships” to de facto heterosexual marriages 
would “unnecessarily put the issue of sex back in the Bill”. Indeed, it passed unopposed, with 
Liberal concerns directed not towards its potential effects on the institution of marriage, but 
toward the idea that a broad, functionalist definition might “undermine the spirit of 
voluntarism (Humphries, 1994, p. 1802). 
Three states followed the ACT between 1999 and 2002. New South Wales’ Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 created a broad, functionalist definition of 
a “domestic partnership” (s. 5), although it retained “de facto relationship[s]” as a subset of 
domestic partnerships (using the qualifying criteria later adopted by New Zealand and the 
Australian Commonwealth) (s. 4). Its amendments to other legislation to reconcile the legal 
position of non-marital relationships and marriages granted some rights to domestic partners 
generally and in other cases limited rights to de facto partners (often by including them 
within the definition of “spouse”). 
Queensland and Victoria protected same-sex de facto couples in 1999 and 2001 
respectively. Both changes determined the existence of a relationship on whether two people 
                                                 
11
 New South Wales (1984, 1999), Victoria (1987, 2001), ACT (Labor minority, 1994), Queensland (1999), 
Western Australia (2002), Tasmania (1999, 2003), the Northern Territory (2003/4) and South Australia (2006) 
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lived together “on a genuine domestic basis”, although Queensland’s Property Law 
Amendment Act 1999 used the term “de facto spouse”, while Victoria’s Statute Law 
Amendment (Relationships) Act 2001 used “domestic partner”. Neither bill was presented as 
desexualising the issue of relationship recognition (as in the ACT); the Queensland Attorney-
General argued that there was a need to specifically protect same-sex couples (Foley, 1999, 
pp. 6283–4). The Queensland bill earned partial Liberal support, but National and One Nation 
MPs argued against treating homosexual and heterosexual relationships identically, though 
they could support de facto protections as a means of “recognis[ing] social reality” 
(Springborg, 1999, p. 6260). One Nation’s William Feldman (1999, pp. 6276–6277) 
portrayed the inclusion of same-sex couples as part of a “spiritual war”, ruining “otherwise 
good legislation”. 
These developments, when considered in the light of John Howard’s personal 
opposition to protecting homosexual couples, provided an obstacle in the path of federal 
recognition of de facto relationships. Abjorensen (2008, pp. 74–75) points out that the LPA 
relies more heavily on its leadership than the ALP in setting a policy direction because the 
ALP pledge requires its representatives to vote for the party platform. The Liberal leader’s 
position is simultaneously more vulnerable because they are selected solely by their caucus. 
Abjorensen argues that Liberal leaders consequently avoid raising internally divisive issues. 
While the LPA theoretically supported protecting heterosexual de facto relationships 
(Blanchfield Nicholls Partners, 2008), raising the issue would put the government in the 
position of actively discriminating against same-sex couples, rather than simply offering 
continuity from state legislation. Moreover, as state Liberals were split on the issue, and the 
National Party (NPA) opposed recognising same-sex relationships, Howard could not readily 
propose either an exclusive or inclusive definition without provoking division within the 
Coalition. 
By the time Labor eventually introduced the Family Law Amendment (De Facto 
Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008, every state and territory protected same-sex 
couples, essentially neutralising conservatives’ opportunity to depict including same-sex 
couples as social engineering. Consequently, opponents expressed general platitudes of 
support for de facto (and, indeed, same-sex) couples, but also depicted marriage as the 
“ideal” relationship (Morrison, 2008, pp. 6512–6513). Despite endorsing marriage as the 
“most secure” environment for raising children, Pentecostal Liberal MP Scott Morrison could 
also endorse protections for de facto couples in the interests of children by citing a dramatic 
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increase in out-of-wedlock births (Morrison, 2008, p. 6514). Opposition representatives did, 
however, find an issue of contention in the new sections 79(10)(aa) and 90SM(10)(d) of the 
FLA, which accord de facto partners the right to become parties to matrimonial proceedings 
involving their partner and vice versa. Liberal MPs argued that the bill would diminish 
married people’s rights while protecting infidelity and de facto polygamy (Bishop, 2008, p. 
6522; Morrison, 2008, pp. 6516–6517). 
Registered relationships and civil unions 
A second trend in state-level policy-making – towards allowing various models of 
opt-in non-marital relationships – did not obstruct federal recognition of de facto 
relationships. In the absence of an alternative, opt-out path, registered relationships provide 
diminished protection for vulnerable de facto partners, as relationship rights are contingent on 
their partner’s willingness to enter and remain within the legal relationship, regardless of the 
reality of the lived relationship. The dual-path approach pioneered by the Tasmanian 
Relationships Act 2003 retains the protective element of the opt-out approach, while allowing 
partners to guarantee their legal standing through registration. 
Registered relationships or civil unions are currently available in the ACT, New South 
Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, but the process of entering the relationship 
differs in each state. Tasmania and the ACT allow couples to mark their relationship with a 
formal ceremony (BDM Tasmania, 2014; Office of Regulatory Services, 2013). The ACT 
originally attempted to create civil unions in 2006, but was blocked by the Howard 
government (AAP, 2006), which considered civil unions too similar to same-sex marriage. 
While the Rudd-Gillard government lifted this ban, allowing the ACT to pass its Civil Union 
Act 2012, LGBT rights activists believed that the ALP pushed the ACT and New South 
Wales to “water down” ceremonial aspects of registered relationship and civil union 
formation to make them appear less marriage-like (Croome, 2010). Queensland’s Labor 
government passed the Civil Partnerships Act 2011 on a conscience vote (Liberals voted en 
bloc) (Hurst, 2011), allowing couples to mark their relationships with a ceremony, and 
requiring the same standard of irreconcilable separation as marriage (Civil Partnerships Act, 
2011, 18 [as enacted]). The following year, however, the newly-elected Liberal government 
deceremonialised these partnerships, renamed them as registered relationships (Hurst, 2012), 
and removed the court process to end the relationship (Civil Partnerships and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2012, s. 16). The government could argue that they were 
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protecting the uniqueness of marriage, while not dramatically eroding the rights of those 
already in civil partnerships, as might have been the case had they simply abolished the status 
altogether. 
RELATIONSHIP EXIT 
The Family Law Act 1975 covers all matters connected to relationship termination for 
which the federal government takes responsibility, including divorce, maintenance and 
property division. States and territories that offer alternative formal relationships have their 
own systems for dissolving these relationships, though the consequences are usually dealt 
with through the federal system. 
Separation and dissolution 
Part VI of the FLA governs separation and divorce (“divorce” replaced “dissolution” 
in 2005 to “increase[e] the public’s understanding” of the issue (Ruddock, 2005, p. 127)). 
The Act instituted exclusive no-fault divorce, similar to that of New Zealand. The 
Commonwealth followed South Australia and Western Australia in introducing divorce on 
the basis of long-term separation in 1959 with the Matrimonial Causes Act, but as one of a 
number of grounds (Finlay, 1974, p. 88). The sole ground for divorce under the FLA is that a 
marriage “has broken down irretrievably” (s. 48(1)), for which the only possible proof is that 
the spouses have ceased cohabitation for at least a year (s. 48(2)), and there is no “reasonable 
likelihood” of this changing. 
Exclusive no-fault divorce has enjoyed broad support since its introduction. Although 
Liberal MPs, including John Howard, attempted to amend the Family Law Bill to require a 
two-year separation and acknowledge the central role of marriage in society (Murray, 2010, 
p. 243), subsequent Liberal governments have not extended the period. John Bradford (later 
sole representative of the Christian Democratic Party) accused government policy settings of 
abetting divorce while debating the Family Law Reform Bill 1994 [No. 2]
12
. Rather than 
advocating fault-based divorce, however, Bradford focused on the welfare and tax systems, 
arguing that the welfare systems made living independently too easy for separating spouses, 
and that the tax system disadvantaged traditional, single-earner families (Bradford, 1994, pp. 
2884–2885). 
                                                 
12
 Passed as the Family Law Reform Act 1995. 
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The FLA originally funded marriage counselling organisations to promote 
reconciliation. Married people could request these services before taking legal action (s. 15-
16 [as enacted]), and judges could halt divorce proceedings to require couples to attend 
counselling when reconciliation might be possible (s. 14 [as enacted]), reinforcing the 
principle that marriage should be lifelong. While reconciliation remains present in the Act, its 
importance has diminished considerably relative to conciliation. 
The Courts (Mediation and Arbitration) Act 1991 and Family Law Reform Act 1995 
began this trend, introducing mediation and arbitration to promote agreement between 
spouses on property issues Courts (Mediation and Arbitration) Act, 1991, s. 4) and childcare 
issues (Family Law Reform Act, 1995, s. 4), and extended the definition of counselling to 
cover family and child counselling in addition to marriage counselling (Family Law Reform 
Act, 1995, s. 4). These changes treated divorce as an acceptable, manageable outcome for the 
first time. Bradford (1994, p. 2887) interpreted the introduction of mediation as a destructive 
move, intended to “help [couples] further the cause of breaking up their relationship” at the 
expense of reconciliation. ALP representative Roger Price (1994, p. 2889) shared this 
disappointment, having been impressed by New Zealand’s Family Court procedures on a 
tour. 
The trend towards conciliation rather than reconciliation continued under the Howard 
government with the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006. 
Section 36 eliminated couples’ ability to pre-emptively request marriage counselling services 
as part of a substantial review of the system to allow it to deal more efficiently and 
effectively with issues around childcare. Under FLA s. 13B, however, the court must still 
adjourn proceedings and refer couples to counselling where reconciliation appears possible. 
The 2006 amendments refocused the FLA on out-of-court conciliation through Family 
Relationships Centres and Family Dispute Resolution. Then-Attorney-General Philip 
Ruddock argued that Family Relationships Centres – independently-run, government-
financed relationship services hubs – would become “the first port of call for when people 
need help to make their relationships stronger or when relationships end” (AAP, 2005). Van 
Acker (2008, p. 104) and Chappell & Costello (2011, p. 639), however, observe a different 
motivation behind the changes, arguing that they were primarily a response to the 
dissatisfaction of men’s rights activists with allegedly discriminatory custody decisions. The 
government itself expressed concern that the community would regard Family Relationships 
Centres as “divorce shops”, simply helping couples to divorce more cheaply and quickly, 
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rather than supporting relationships at all stages (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010, p. 
50).  
Property division 
Parts VIII and VIIIAB of the FLA deal with the financial implications of separation 
for married and de facto couples respectively. The original Act provided a consistent property 
regime for married couples across Australia, but forced unmarried couples to rely on common 
law or, following the passage of de facto property laws at the state and territory level, on 
these highly variable laws. This exacerbated power imbalances in financially-uneven non-
qualifying relationships, as financially-dominant partners could disempower their partners by 
threatening to withdraw their support. 
Sections 72-77A govern spousal maintenance, which the law views from a 
functionalist perspective, rather than as an inherent right deriving from the “married” status. 
The ‘right’ to maintenance is conditional both on the ability of the supporting party to 
provide maintenance, and on the supported party having a ‘legitimate’ reason for being 
unable to support themselves. While the chief bases for maintenance are childcare and 
incapacity for employment (s. 72(1)(a-b)), courts may consider a range of other factors 
including how the marriage has affected the supported party’s ability to provide for 
themselves. One of these factors, section 75(2)(l), protects the male breadwinner model by 
identifying a “need to protect a party who wishes to continue that party’s role as a parent”.  
This wording, implemented by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983, replaced the original 
gendered protection for a woman wishing “only to continue her role as a wife and mother” 
but, given that childcare remains highly gendered within marriages, it largely retains the pro-
traditional effect of the original. 
Prior to 2008, many de facto partners still had either no right or a diminished right to 
maintenance. New South Wales and ACT relationships legislation offered more limited 
grounds for maintenance than the FLA (Property (Relationships) Act 1984 [NSW], s. 27; 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 [ACT], s. 19). They did not provide for a “reasonable 
standard of living”, compensate for the impact of a de facto relationship on a partner’s 
earning capacity, or protect somebody wishing to continue their parental role (FLA, 1975, 
75(2)(g, k, l)). Victoria (prior to the Relationships Act 2008) and Queensland did not 
recognise any right to maintenance. Standardising the entitlement of de facto couples to 
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maintenance provided a key motivation for Labor MPs in supporting Commonwealth 
protections for de facto couples (Neumann, 2008, p. 6519). 
The Australian matrimonial property regime makes no effective distinction between 
relationship property and separate property, and no distinction between different categories of 
property (home, chattels, and other property in the New Zealand regime); all the property 
belonging to either spouse can be considered matrimonial property (FLA, 1975, ss. 78-79). It 
does not assume equal division of property; while an order must be “just and equitable” (s. 
79(2)), this relates to each partner’s contributions, whether in financial or non-financial 
terms, to the development of their property, and to the “welfare of the family”, as well as the 
effects of division on the wellbeing of the spouses and their children, and the criteria for 
maintenance outlined in s. 75(2). 
The Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 
2008 created Part VIIIAB as a mirror of Part VIII. Whilst Part VIIIAB is significantly more 
complex on paper than Part VIII, these complexities are of little significance in practice (they 
relate to the need to incorporate the concept of participating jurisdictions). However, despite 
the general correspondence of the two regimes, there are a handful of subtle differences that 
reflect different expectations of permanence and commitment between marriage and de facto 
relationships. 
Firstly, while there are no restrictions on the access of married couples to the 
matrimonial property regime, de facto couples cannot automatically access the de facto 
property regime. To qualify, they must satisfy the Family Court either that their de facto 
relationship has lasted two years, that they have a child together, that they have registered 
their relationship in a state where that is possible, or that denying them access would 
perpetrate “serious injustice” (s. 90SB). The de facto regime also lacks an equivalent of 
section 79(1B) (introduced in 1983), which allows the court to adjourn property proceedings 
other than where a divorce action is imminent, ongoing, or completed, to “consider the 
effects… of an order… on [their] marriage or the children of [their] marriage”. Under this 
provision, preserving the health of a marriage takes precedence over the desires of the 
individuals involved for a prompt, equitable division. Reserving this provision exclusively for 
the matrimonial property regime upholds the idea that marriages are worth more than de facto 
relationships and reinforces the idea that the state, consequentially, has a duty of care for 
marriage. It also positions mutual control over marital resources, rather than “independent” 
control of personal resources, as part of the correct ordering of marriage. 




While the Abbott government elected in 2013 has not attempted to alter divorce law, 
it has nevertheless identified divorce as a core social problem in which government 
intervention is necessary. The “Stronger Relationships” programme, first proposed by the 
Coalition in opposition in 2010 (Maley, 2013), and implemented from July 2014, offers a 
$200 voucher for couples to use with an approved relationship services provider (Department 
of Social Services, 2014). Although its champion, Kevin Andrews – who, with his wife, has 
worked as a marriage educator – conceived of the scheme as being primarily about premarital 
education (Penberth & Andrews, 2014), it is theoretically open to all interested couples, 
regardless of relationship form. 
The scheme moves subtly away from the non-interventionist consensus around 
relationship breakdown, accepting that government has a role to play – however minor – in 
preventing breakdown during relationships, rather than trying to mend broken relationships or 
deal with their consequences. Rather than argue that reducing the incidence of divorce is 
important solely from a moralist perspective, Andrews argues that the cost of divorce (for 
which he has suggested figures ranging from $3 to $15 billion dollars a year) makes 
intervention necessary (Bearup, 2014; Penberth & Andrews, 2014). Making this economic 
case – and making the scheme open to all couples – allows the government to claim that the 
scheme is more than an attempt to impose traditionalist values by propaganda. The economic-
rationalist approach also serves to defend the scheme from criticism (e.g. Leaver, 2014) that 
it is an extravagance in a period of drastic budget cuts. There is a clear difference on this 
issue between the approaches of the Australian Coalition government and the New Zealand 
National government, which did not consider the wider economic impact of divorce in its 
decision to defund court-based relationship counselling. 
Strengthening Families 
The Stronger Relationships programme hearkens back to a previous Coalition 
initiative, the Strengthening Families Strategy, an explicitly pro-traditionalist programme that 
depicted the promotion of male breadwinner families as a legitimate liberal objective through 
the language of “choice” (Whitehouse, 2004, pp. 379–380). The Strategy included funding 
for relationship education, but also provided tax advantages for families with children, 
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focusing on single-income families in particular. As originally conceived in 1996, the Family 
Tax Initiative allowed single-income families to earn an extra $2,500 tax-free (Costello, 
1996). Howard construed advantaging single-earner families as support for families’ own 
choices, rather than a government agenda to create more male-breadwinner families (Murray, 
2010, p. 246). While the single-earner advantage has changed in structure to a means-tested 
allowance, Family Tax Benefit B (FTB-B) (DHS, 2014a), and is available to de facto partners 
as well as single parents and married couples, it remains a core element of Australian family 
policy for the time being. The benefit’s eventual downfall may lie in fiscal constraints rather 
than changing social attitudes; while the Howard government steadily increased the level of 
FTB-B (Liberal-National Coalition, 2004, pp. 5–6),  the 2014-15 Budget restricts eligibility 
for FTB-B to parents of under-6s as part of the Abbott government’s cost-cutting agenda. 
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CHAPTER 6: UNITED STATES 
American relationships policies are primarily the responsibility of the states rather 
than the federal government. States register marriages and are responsible for policies on 
divorce, de facto relationships, and civil unions. The federal government is involved in 
relationships policy through the tax and welfare systems, and in funding marital support 
services. 
RELATIONSHIP ENTRANCE AND DEFINITION 
MARRIAGE 
Defining marriage 
There is considerable variation between states in how marriage is defined and 
contracted. Same-sex marriage has been the most significant issue in marriage definition 
between 1990 and 2014. Before 1993, states usually assumed that marriage was exclusively 
heterosexual without explicitly stating it. Oklahoma, for instance, defined marriage only as “a 
personal relation arising out of a civil contract” with associated requirements for consent 
(Oklahoma Statutes (OKS) §43-1). Hawaiʻi did not define marriage, but did regulate it in 
gendered language referring to “the man and the woman” (Klingerman & May, 1994, p. 449). 
In 1993, however, a group of same-sex couples won a partial victory in the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court, which required the state to provide a “compelling state interest” for denying them 
marriage licenses (Klingerman & May, 1994, pp. 447–448). The court suggested that the 
state had violated its constitution by discriminating on the basis of sex (Cox, 1994, p. 1051). 
This created a “crisis” for every other state, because the “Full Faith and Credit” 
section of the Constitution of the United States (Art. 4, §1) requires each state to recognise 
other states’ “acts, records, and judicial proceedings”. Same-sex couples married in Hawai‘i 
might require the federal government and other states to recognise their marriage (Cox, 1994, 
p. 1040). Hawai‘i responded initially by inserting a clarification that only opposite-sex 
marriages were valid, but the court deemed this insufficient (Bowman, 2004, p. 135). The 
state eventually satisfied the court by implementing a “reciprocal beneficiaries” scheme that 
reduced the inequalities caused by denying same-sex marriage, and amending its constitution 
by referendum in 1998 to permit the legislature to prevent same-sex marriages. 
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The Hawaiʻian debate also triggered federal action to forestall the potential effects of 
the “Full Faith and Credit” clause. The Defence of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA) asserted 
states’ right to ignore same-sex marriages registered elsewhere and prevented the federal 
government recognising same-sex marriage. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (1996, p. 
S10101) argued that the “Full Faith and Credit” circumvention was necessary to defend the 
country from a “handful of judges”, and that allowing same-sex couples equal access to 
federal programmes would have severe “financial and social consequences”. DOMA 
opponents, while not necessarily endorsing same-sex marriage (and occasionally asserting 
their opposition), portrayed it as unconstitutional and “mean-spirited” (Kennedy, 1996, p. 
S10101; Kerry, 1996, p. S10108). Despite its uncertain constitutionality, DOMA received 
veto-proof majorities in both chambers; a clear majority of Democrats and a near-unanimity 
of Republicans supported the bill (of Republicans, only openly-gay Steve Gunderson 
dissented) (GovTrack, 2014a, 2014b). 
A wave of state-level action occurred in conjunction with DOMA; a majority of states 
passed local versions of the federal law (Pinello, 2006, p. 33). This included the additions of 
OKS §43-3.1 in 1996 and Arkansas Code §9-11-109 in 1997. Despite traditionalists’ 
legislative success, same-sex marriage supporters used the judicial system as an alternative 
venue, less susceptible to popular opinion. Vermont’s Supreme Court found in 1999 that the 
state constitution required Vermont to provide equal benefits to same-sex couples (Charron, 
2000). However, as the court did not require Vermont to provide same-sex marriage, the 
legislature developed civil unions as a compromise. 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage supporters won a similar case in 2003, again based 
on a state constitution equal protection clause, but the courts refused to accept anything other 
than same-sex marriage (Pinello, 2006, pp. 43–44). The Massachusetts Senate President 
ignored a petition at the state Constitutional Convention for a referendum on the matter 
(Pinello, 2006, p. 36), forcing same-sex marriage opponents to pursue a longer process, by 
the conclusion of which same-sex marriage was well established. 
The Massachusetts decision triggered another flurry of state action in the form of state 
constitutional amendments. Eleven states passed constitutional bans on same-sex marriage in 
2004, with support ranging from 57% in Oregon to 86% in South Carolina (CNN, 2004). 
However, these actions have only delayed the introduction of same-sex marriage. Same-sex 
marriage advocates excluded from state courts by constitutional amendments have turned to 
the federal constitution and courts instead. Californian voters banned same-sex marriage in 
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2008 following campaigning by a coalition of religious groups (The Economist, 2008a, 
2008b). While the state Supreme Court upheld this ban, federal courts ruled it 
unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the federal constitution’s equal protection clause 
(Nagourney, 2012). Subsequent decisions in other states have eliminated bans on same-sex 
marriage on similar grounds (Barnes, 2014; Stutzman, 2014) and found DOMA partially 
unconstitutional (GLAD, 2013). 
State legislatures have become increasingly viable options for same-sex marriage 
advocates. Polling suggests that American attitudes to same-sex marriage have shifted 
considerably (McCarthy, 2014), reducing the potential electoral penalties for legislators who 
endorse same-sex marriage, and making constitutional amendments more difficult for 
conservatives. In 2009, Vermont became the first state to choose to adopt same-sex marriage 
(Richburg, 2009). Same-sex marriage advocates now have three levels of opportunity, and 
need only succeed at one to achieve their goal, while their opponents must win at each level. 
Age of marriage 
The age of consent to marriage has changed surprisingly little in the US. While the 
age of non-restricted consent is at least 18 throughout America, and marriages of those aged 
16-17 usually require parent permission, many states have no absolute minimum age (Leiter, 
2008, pp. 463–468). This is not necessarily due to a lack of attention to legislative minutiae. 
In 2004, Oklahoma simplified the language in OKS §43-3(B)(2), which allows courts to 
permit anybody under age 16 to marry “in settlement of a suit or seduction or paternity” or 
when the bride is pregnant or has given birth. Low minimum ages have persisted despite 
evidence that early marriages fail at considerably higher rates than adult marriages (Le Strat, 
Dubertret, & Le Foll, 2011, p. 530), and despite the federal government funding research into 
eliminating child marriage overseas (Jain & Kurz, 2007). 
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Figure 1: Absolute minimum ages of marriage in the United States 
 
Sources: Leiter (2008, pp. 463–368); Kansas Statutes §23-2505 
Marriage celebrants and solemnisation 
American marriage celebrants are either civil or religious celebrants. Most American 
civil celebrants derive their authority from their standing in the legal system, rather than as 
community representatives as in Australia and New Zealand. Oklahoma allows only active or 
retired judges (OKS §43-7), while Louisiana and Hawaiʻi include justices of the peace and 
magistrates respectively (Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HIRS) §572-12; Louisiana Revised 
Statutes (LARS) 9§203), and California authorises State and Federal legislators (California 
Family Code (CAFC) §400). 
This is not always strictly the case. Vermont allows people to register to celebrate 
individual weddings (Vermont Statutes 18§5144a), while New Jersey allows people to 
qualify as civil celebrants by completing a course (an individual-merit rather than 
community-representation basis for celebrancy) (New Jersey Statutes 37§1-13). Otherwise, 
secular celebrants may qualify as “clergy” through authorisation by groups such as the 
Humanist Society (2013, p. 13). Nevertheless, restricting civil solemnisation rights in most 
cases to judicial professionals emphasises an understanding of marriage as a contract, rather 
than a commitment embedded in the community. Strow & Strow (2006, p. 241) point out 
that, in early New England, marriage was entirely the domain of the judiciary rather than 
clergy, in order to emphasise this (Protestant) contractual understanding over a (Catholic) 
sacramental understanding. 
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Covenant marriage 
Three states, beginning with Louisiana in 1997, have experimented with allowing 
couples to contract “covenant marriages”. These restrict divorce options, theoretically 
requiring couples to demonstrate a stronger commitment to their marriage. Covenant spouses 
agree to “love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of [their] 
lives” (Arizona Revised Statutes (AZRS) §25-901(B)(1); Arkansas Code §9-11-804(a)(1); 
LARS 9§273(A)(1)). While the effects of covenant marriages vary between states, the bulk of 
this  declaration transferred wholly from Louisiana to Arizona and Arkansas, and to proposed 
legislation such as the 2004 SB882 in Oklahoma (proposed OKS §43-6.1). 
Covenant marriage schemes allow states to require forethought from prospective 
spouses. Couples undergo premarital counselling from either a religious minister or relevant 
professional (LARS 9§273(A)(2), 9§275(C)(1)(b). This allows the state to reinforce the 
understandings of marriage favoured by legislative and religious elites without coercively 
interfering in married couples’ lived relationships. Covenant marriage schemes have minimal 
practical effect. In Louisiana, where they are most popular, only 2% of marriages are 
covenant marriages (National Healthy Marriage Resource Center, 2010, p. 3). 
Attempts to introduce covenant marriages elsewhere have failed. National social 
conservative organisations such as Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council that 
organise against policies such as same-sex marriage have not supported individual 
legislators’ efforts (despite the instigator of covenant marriage in Louisiana heading the 
Family Research Council) (M. A. Smith, 2010). Some conservatives disagree in principle 
with offering multiple forms of marriage (Nock, Wright, & Sanchez, 1999, p. 45). The 
Catholic Church criticises covenant marriage as depicting other marriages as inferior 
(National Healthy Marriage Resource Center, 2010, p. 2), while the President of Concerned 
Women for America (CWfA) suggested that it also allowed too many loopholes (Pate, 1998) 
Feminist organisations, however, do organise against covenant marriage. Nock et al. 
(1999, p. 47) found concern amongst Louisianan feminists that religious leaders would use 
premarital education to promote traditional gender roles. The Kansas National Organisation 
for Women argued in a hearing that the model proposed there would impose unjust financial 
burdens on women seeking divorce, potentially trapping them in dangerous marriages 
(Rinker, 2010). Curiously, this submission also echoed conservative rhetoric from the same-
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sex marriage debate, accusing the initiative of “allow[ing] special interests to continually re-
define matrimony in our state”. 
Alternative premarital schemes – licenses as policy 
Other states promote premarital education to all couples. Texas Republicans linked 
premarital education to license issuance in 1999 in an attempt to reduce the divorce rate 
(Office of House Bill Analysis, 1999). Clerks must inform couples about premarital 
education opportunities (Texas Family Code (TXFC) §2.009(c)(5)). Couples are excused part 
of their license fee on completion of a course covering “conflict management,… 
communication skills… and the key components of a successful marriage”, conducted 
through a religious or community organisation or private professional (TXFC §2.013; Texas 
Health and Human Services Commission, n.d.). Otherwise, the state uses part of this fee to 
develop low-cost premarital courses and research into family strengthening (TXFC 
§2.014(b)). The committee process, which involved family professionals (Juvenile Justice & 
Family Issues Committee, 1999), minimised its pro-traditionalist character. The original bill 
required, rather than incentivised, participation (Office of House Bill Analysis, 1999). 
Another group of states uses the licensing process to mitigate the consequences of 
relationship disharmony. In 1997, Hawaiʻi established funds, part-financed by marriage 
license fees (HIRS §572-5), to support domestic abuse programmes (State of Hawai‘i 
Department of Health, 2010; HIRS §346-7.5, §601-3.6). This tactic, focusing primarily on the 
most extreme consequences of relationship breakdowns rather than their prevention, reflects 
an essentially non-interventionist approach. Hawaiʻi also uses the license issuance process to 
supply couples with information about issues such as birth defects and STIs
13
 (HIRS §572-
5(d)), as does California (CAFC §358). Despite marriage not being seen in these states as a 
necessary prerequisite for childbearing, it remains a key point of contact. 
NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Bowman (2004) identifies five approaches that states use to deal with relationships 
outside conventionally-contracted marriage: common-law marriage; relationship contracts; 
civil unions or domestic partnerships; assigning particular rights to cohabitants; or not 
recognising non-marital relationships. Common-law marriage, once commonplace, is now 
restricted to a handful of states. Civil unions and domestic partnerships have developed 
                                                 
13
 Intriguingly, HIRS §572-5(d) requires agents to also supply information on “population stabilization”, 
suggesting an anti-natalist agenda. 
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recently as a hedge against same-sex marriage. The rights accorded to cohabitants have 
increased incrementally in response to perceived injustices. 
Common-law spouses are recognised as equal to formally-married spouses, and their 
rights are recognised throughout America. However, entrance to common-law marriage is 
increasingly restricted. Merriman (2007) attributes the historical importance of common-law 
marriage to the isolated nature of many American settlements until relatively recently; 
improved access to government removes the need for informal marriage. Four states ceased 
recognising new common-law marriages between 1990 and 2005, leaving ten states 
remaining. In Pennsylvania, change was not driven by pro-traditionalist qualms about 
common-law marriage, but by pragmatic concerns over the uncertainty of their existence and 
the potential for “fraudulent attempts to win death benefits” (Toland, 2004). Texas attempts 
to avoid uncertainty by allowing couples to legally declare their “informal marriage”, without 
which the relationship’s existence may be called into question (TXFC §2.401). 
Domestic partnerships originally developed at the local government level. San 
Francisco established a partnership registry in 1989 (Bowman, 2004, p. 134), before 
California adopted partnerships in 1999 (Batten, 2010). Local authorities’ limited capacity 
meant that early domestic partnerships could convey only limited benefits, principally to 
these authorities’ employees (Bowman, 2004, p. 134). Because civil unions developed in 
Vermont as a functionally equal counterpart to marriage, they carried far greater legal rights 
from the start (Goldberg, 2000). Civil unions and domestic partnerships are usually restricted 
to same-sex couples, although California and New Jersey allowed elderly heterosexual 
couples to access the status (to protect their children’s inheritance rights14), and Hawaiʻi 
allowed legally-unmarriageable heterosexual couples to become “reciprocal beneficiaries”, 
effectively desexualising the policy (Bowman, 2004, pp. 135, 137). 
Domestic partners’ rights vary considerably. California partners’ rights were initially 
limited, but were expanded by legislation in 2003 to be essentially equivalent to marriage 
(Traiman, 2008). Washington similarly expanded domestic partnership rights in 2009, two 
years after introducing the status (La Corte, 2009). Following Washington’s adoption of 
same-sex marriage, domestic partnerships of couples under 62 are being converted to 
marriage (Washington Secretary of State, 2014). A state constitutional ban in Wisconsin on 
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 In this situation, the lack of recognition of non-marital relationships by the federal government worked in 
these couples’ favour. Married or divorced people who are not entitled to receive Social Security retirement 
benefits in their own right may access these through their spouse or former spouse. Remarrying, however, could 
cause a divorced person to lose these benefits (Bowman, 2004, pp. 135).  
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according homosexual relationships a status similar to marriage means that the domestic 
partnership regime offers a limited selection of rights (Ferguson, Stein, & Silverstein, 2014). 
State recognition for de facto relationships is more limited. Cohabitants must usually 
make a contract to expand their rights against each other beyond those of legal strangers 
(Bowman, 2004, pp. 126–127), and judges in Illinois, Georgia, and Louisiana ignore 
contracts between cohabitants.  In Washington, separating couples are subject to property 
division if their relationship is identified as marriage-like, but this identification takes place 
only after the end of the relationship (Northwest Justice Project, 2010). As a judicial, rather 
than legislative construction, this “meretricious relationship status” may be somewhat 
precarious (Wallace, 2005, pp. 253–255). Bowman (2004, pp. 141–142) notes that, beginning 
as early as 1968, the courts in a number of states have progressively allowed cohabitants to 
make claims against third parties in cases such as wrongful death, and that local governments 
regularly cover health insurance for cohabitants. Because many of these rights are essentially 
at judicial discretion, and may be difficult to access for many cohabitants, the only certain 
means of securing the full rights accorded to marriage is to marry. 
RELATIONSHIP EXIT 
Separation and dissolution 
During the 1970s and 1980s, every American state adopted no-fault divorce 
15
 
(Wolfinger, 2005, pp. 407–408). Many of their systems operate quite differently from those 
of Australasia, and a particular state’s model may not correspond to its perceived ideological 
position. Calfornia and Hawaiʻi use the exclusive no-fault model found in the Antipodes. 
California allows divorce on the basis of “irreconciliable differences” or “incurable insanity” 
(CAFC §2310). Hawaiʻi requires marriages to be “irretrievably broken” or to meet a 
separation-based qualification (HIRS §580-41). 
Another set of states mixes fault and no-fault grounds for divorce. This allows for 
low-conflict divorces, but also allows aggrieved spouses to pursue an action that labels their 
spouse as guilty (and in some cases influences property settlements). Oklahoma introduced 
an “incompatibility” ground early, but also offers nine fault grounds and grounds of insanity 
(OKS §43-101). Vermont offers no-fault divorces following an irreconcilable six-month 
separation, five fault grounds and grounds of insanity (Vermont Statutes 15§551). 
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 Alaska, Maryland and Oklahoma already had no-fault divorce options. 
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Figure 2: Divorce regimes in the United States 
 
Sources: Leiter (2008, pp. 463–368); New York Domestic Relations Code §170 
The Vermont law reflects the curious reality that the American North-East, despite its 
liberal reputation, emerged from the no-fault reform period with non-exclusive divorce 
models (Simmons, 1998, p. 7). New York introduced a truly unilateral no-fault option only in 
2010. Formerly, divorces were granted only on the basis of four fault grounds, a year-long 
separation following a judicial separation (granted on a fault basis), or a two-year separation 
following a separation agreement. 
While conservative actors resisted change in this last hold-out, they have made little 
impact in undoing the no-fault hegemony. Even when successfully implemented, covenant 
marriage does not dramatically affect the status quo. Louisianan covenant marriages are 
subject to non-exclusive, separation-based no-fault divorce (LARS 9§306). Arizona’s 
covenant marriage regime allows no-fault divorce not only on the basis of separation, but also 
by mutual consent (AZRS §25-903(5-6, 8)). Covenant marriage’s most substantial barrier to 
divorce is the requirement for covenant spouses to undergo counselling “once [they] 
experience marital difficulties” (LARS 9§307(C))16. 
Broadly speaking, two models of matrimonial property exist in America: community 
and non-community states. However, these do not translate directly into two models of 
property division at divorce, because the question of ownership during marriage is 
                                                 
16
 Act No. 490 of 2004 amended the 1997 legislation (Act No. 1380) to clarify that reconciliation efforts should 
continue from a couple’s first difficulties to the judgment of divorce, except in cases of domestic abuse. 
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disconnected from the question of who should own it afterwards. Instead, all American 
models of matrimonial property division operate on some type of community-basis. Some 
community property states use a 50-50 split as in 1976-2001 New Zealand, while the 
remaining states divide property on an equitable basis relating to marital contributions 
(Oldham, 2008, p. 431). 
Ending non-marital relationships 
The process required to end a non-marital relationship relates to the status accorded to 
the relationship. American civil unions’ origins as marriage-by-another-name  (Goldberg, 
2000) mean that their dissolution processes mirror divorce processes (Student Legal Service, 
n.d.). However, out-of-state couples who registered civil unions in Vermont could not 
originally dissolve their relationship without one partner migrating to Vermont for a year as 
their relationships were not recognised elsewhere (Vermont Freedom to Marry, 2012), 
potentially leaving partners endangered, financially-trapped, or unable to contract another 
relationship. This was resolved only in 2012, when Act No. 92 created a process for non-
resident couples to dissolve their relationship from elsewhere. 
Domestic partnership exit processes have evolved alongside their status. Californian 
domestic partnerships were initially dissolved outside judicial processes, but when the state 
accorded greater rights to the relationships in 2005 it also revised the termination process so 
that only partners with low levels of commitment and interdependency (in terms of duration, 
children, and property interests) could end their relationships without a full legal process 
(CAFC §299, 299.3). In Wisconsin, where domestic partnerships retain a sub-marriage legal 
status, a partner may unilaterally dissolve their partnership with a 90-day waiting period 
(Wisconsin Statutes §770-12), while divorces require a year-long separation or judicial ruling 
of irreconcilability (Wisconsin Statutes §767.315). 
Reconciliation and conciliation 
States’ roles in promoting reconciliation vary considerably. A number of states, 
including California and Arizona, established “conciliation courts” in the 1960s to provide 
marital counselling (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, 2014). Since the 1980s, 
these courts have focused primarily on mediating custody disputes, although some 
reconciliatory efforts remain. Arizonan conciliation courts (which offer most services free) 
provide reconciliatory counselling alongside their mediation services (Judicial Branch of 
Arizona Pinal County, 2014; AZRS §25-381.16). Californian family conciliation courts play 
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a similar role, and may even attempt to reconcile unmarried couples when children are 
involved (CAFC §1830). The primarily non-interventionist character of these states’ 
relationship exit regimes stand somewhat in contrast to their mission statements, which 
declare marital stability to be a legitimate focus of state attention: 
The purposes of this part are to protect the rights of children and to 
promote the public welfare by preserving, promoting, and protecting 
family life and the institution of matrimony, and to provide means for 
the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of domestic 
and family controversies. 
CAFC §1801; AZRS §25-381.01 inverts two clauses 
States that retain a reconciliation focus do not necessarily take full responsibility for 
achieving reconciliation; California, Arizona and New York involve non-government 
organisations, including religious groups, in the process (New York Family Court Act §923). 
An alternative approach, practiced in Vermont, is to allow courts to stay proceedings 
for potential reconciliation without providing practical support for achieving it (Vermont 
Statutes §15-552). Even this provision is limited to no-fault cases; fault-based divorces 
provide no opportunity for courts to pursue reconciliation. Vermont does, however, provide 
limited support for conciliation on property and custody matters, promoting and subsidising 
mediation services for low-income couples (Vermont Judiciary, 2007) and working with a 
local university to provide separation education for divorcing parents (University of Vermont, 
2014). 
Voluntary counselling may function to expedite divorce in Oklahoma. Courts may 
waive post-filing waiting periods intended to provide an opportunity for reconciliation if 
counselling is unproductive (OKS §43-107D). Oklahoman parents referred to mediation or 
counselling on custody matters bear the costs themselves (OKS §43-107.3). Otherwise, 
Oklahoman family courts provide only limited educational resources (Tulsa County District 
Court, 2014). Although Vermont countenances somewhat more public support for preserving 
family function through relationship transitions, these states without dedicated 
(re)conciliation courts broadly follow a model that sees preserving relationships as the 
domain of the individuals involved. State involvement in the marital relationship focuses on 
the care of children. 
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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND MARRIAGE 
While the federal government does not regulate marriage, it nevertheless plays an 
active role in relationships policy. Federal legislators focus considerable attention on the 
incentives and disincentives created by federal policies, particularly the interaction of 
marriage and the tax and welfare systems. The “marriage tax penalty” was a prominent 
subject of contention toward the end of the Clinton administration and the first Bush 
administration, leading to significant tax cuts for married Americans. The federal government 
has also developed a role in directly promoting marriage. 
Marriage and the welfare system 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which provided assistance to poor 
single parents without imposing onerous behavioural restrictions, formed a significant part of 
the American welfare system from the 1930s (Berrick, 2005, p. 133), and was regularly 
criticised as disincentivising marriage (Bitler, Gelbach, Hoynes, & Zavodny, 2004, p. 213). 
Legislators from both parties saw the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) as an opportunity to promote positive work habits 
and personal responsibility, reduce the federal government’s reach, and slow welfare 
expenditure growth, while “creat[ing] incentives for families to stay together” (Domenici, 
1996, p. S9322). PRWORA replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
which expanded eligibility for welfare to more married couples while imposing work 
requirements and time limits (Bitler et al., 2004, p. 216). These changes aimed to reduce the 
financial penalties created by marrying to make single parenthood less attractive. 
PRWORA and its supporters (as well as some opponents) depicted the relationship 
between AFDC and unwed parenting as a vicious circle.  Section 101 proclaimed that 
“marriage is the foundation… of a successful society which promotes the interests of 
children” (PRWORA, 1996, §101(1-2)) and included statistics to demonstrate a causal 
connection between the growth of AFDC and extramarital births (PRWORA, 1996, §101(5-6, 
8)). Representatives used these statistics to argue welfare “subsidize[d] and promote[d] self-
destructive behaviour and illegitimacy… and [had] destroyed the family” (Faircloth, 1996, p. 
S9366). PRWORA also provided a crude incentive system for states to discourage 
illegitimacy; states that demonstrated a decrease in illegitimate births would receive a 
significant increase in their “family assistance grant” (PRWORA, 1996, §103). 
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Opponents accepted the principle that illegitimacy was a social problem in which the 
government had a right to intervene. Instead, they objected on the basis that the Act would 
simply hurt children without having the desired impact on illegitimacy or welfare dependency 
(Bradley, 1996, p. S9367; Moseley Braun, 1996, p. S9365), or on the principle that “the 
punishment should never exceed the deed” (Lautenberg, 1996, p. 9324). Despite the 
importance of conservative ideas about ideal family form in the debate, PRWORA was not an 
exclusively pro-traditional policy, as it sacrificed traditional understandings of motherhood as 
the primary role of women. Ultimately, illegitimacy concerns played a secondary role in the 
debate to concerns about welfare dependency. 
Marriage and federal taxation 
The federal tax system creates marriage penalties and benefits by treating married 
couples differently from single people and unmarried couples. Married couples file taxes 
either individually or jointly
17
; each option carries particular advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the economic structure of a marriage. The availability of joint-filing is pro-
traditionalist because it advantages single-earner or dominant-earner couples. When spouses 
earn close to equal amounts, however, they may be disadvantaged by being married because 
married people filing singly have lower tax brackets than single people. The tax deduction 
system is a second factor, as it offers single taxpayers greater “standard” deductions 
(Brozovsky & Cataldo, 1994, p. 166). The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) contributes to 
the marriage penalty faced by low-income working families. The EITC phases out as an 
individual or married couple’s income increases, so marriage may eliminate the tax credit that 
a single taxpayer would otherwise receive (Maag & Carasso, 2014). Strach (2007, p. 116) 
identifies EITC as the most significant penalty as a proportion of a couple’s income. 
While marriage tax penalties still exist for some couples (just as advantages do for 
others), they were blunted by a Republican-led reform effort in 2000-2001. While the 
potential for the tax system to punish marriage had existed for a long time, the salience of the 
problem had increased considerably. Dual-earner marriages peaked in 1996, and wives’ 
contributions to family incomes were steadily increasing (USBLS, 2013, pp. 80–81), so more 
couples faced potential tax disadvantages. Meanwhile, the increased prevalence and 
acceptance of cohabitation amongst young couples reduced the non-financial advantages of 
marriage, creating a need for the government to reward the “right” choice. The issue also 
                                                 
17
 Same-sex married couples were not treated as married by the IRS until DOMA was ruled partially 
unconstitutional (IRS, 2013). 
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allowed Republicans to develop a moral case for cutting taxes to accompany their preferences 
for smaller government. 
The Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000 (MTRRA) and Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) sought to reduce the marriage 
penalty by increasing tax brackets, standard deductions, and the EITC phase-out threshold for 
married couples. Supporters framed the debate as one about fairness and equity, in which the 
tax penalty was an invidious attempt to “nickel and dime the American people” (Pryce, 2000, 
p. H6607). They referred only to marriage penalties, pointing to “25 million married working 
couples… [that] pay an average $1,400 more in higher taxes just because they are married” 
(Weller, 2000, p. H6607), framing the tax system as one that treated marriage in a uniformly 
negative fashion. Democrats opposed to the plan (including President Clinton, who vetoed 
the MTRRA) accepted the importance of reducing marriage penalties, but argued that the 
plan was too expensive, and weighted too heavily to the wealthy (Levin, 2000, p. H6612). 
The EGTRRA, introduced after the election of President George W. Bush, collapsed 
marriage penalty relief into a wider programme of “historic tax relief” (Reynolds, 2001, p. 
H2825). With a president sympathetic to tax cuts, Republicans no longer need to focus on the 
victimisation of the married to justify cuts; indeed, the EGTRRA placed less importance on 
reducing the marriage penalty than the MTRRA had. It delayed the elimination of the 
deduction penalty and 15% tax bracket and reduced the magnitude of the immediate 
extension of the EITC threshold (MTRRA [H.R. 4810 enrolled], 2000, §2-4; EGTRRA, 
2001, §301-303). Strach (2007, p. 120) points out that Republicans wished to avoid 
privileging two-earner families over traditional families. Consequently, they adopted broad 
changes, rather than narrowly addressing dual-earner families’ concerns. 
Healthy Marriage 
Under George W. Bush, the federal government embarked on a programme of 
marriage promotion for vulnerable families through both existing and new government 
programmes. The first such initiative, proposed by the President (Herger, 2001), authorised 
states to use federal money for family support services to fund services to “strengthen 
parental relationships and promote healthy marriages”. The most significant example, 
however, is the Healthy Marriage & Responsible Fatherhood initiative (HMRF), instituted by 
the Deficit Reduction Act 2005. This replaced the illegitimacy-rewards system of PRWORA, 
which had focused solely on family form, with a system that, while remaining grounded in 
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traditionalist ideas, refocused the government’s attention to a greater extent on family 
function. 
In HMRF, the government funds organisations to provide relationship education, 
marriage skills education, premarital education, parenting skills, and work skills, primarily to 
high-risk populations (Office of Family Assistance, 2014a, 2014b). While initially proposed 
by President Bush as part of his “compassionate conservative” agenda (Pear & Kirkpatrick, 
2004), it has continued and expanded under President Obama. The current administration 
claims that it is developing more culturally responsive programmes to deal with vulnerable 
ethnic groups (The White House, 2012, pp. 16–17), a timely shift in approach, given that a 
recent study found that programmes funded through the initiative were ineffective partly 
because they were based on research that focused on “White, middle-class” couples, rather 
than on the vulnerable populations that are the intended target of the initiative (Johnson, 
2012). 
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CHAPTER 7: CLASSIFYING RELATIONSHIPS POLICIES 
In this chapter I adapt Gauthier’s (1996) typology of family policy ideal-types to 
demonstrate that the different approaches to relationships policy that have emerged in New 
Zealand, Australia and America are significant. While Gauthier does not use relationships 
policies in building her typology, the ideological assumptions about how the state should 
intervene in the family that underlie each ideal-type apply equally well to relationships 
policy, with the possible exception of “pro-natalism”, which is tied particularly to childcare 
and population policy. Pro-natalism influenced post-1980 marriage policy in Singapore, 
where the government promoted marriage to encourage child-bearing, However, although 
Heard (2006) points out that pro-natalism has influenced recent Australian family policy, 
there is little evidence that this reaches into relationships policy. Pro-natalism may need to be 
allied to strong sentiments against extramarital childbearing to influence relationships policy. 
I consequently discuss only the remaining three ideal-types here.   
TRANSLATING FAMILY POLICY IDEAL-TYPES TO 
RELATIONSHIPS POLICY 
Pro-traditionalist model 
Gauthier (1996, pp. 203–204) identifies “pro-traditionalism” as the policy ideal-type 
in which preserving the traditional, male-breadwinner family form is the central objective of 
family policy. Although a pro-traditionalist view sees the institution of the traditional family 
as the best provider of wellbeing, the government may intervene to facilitate this, such as by 
offering extensive childcare leave for mothers to allow them to retain the primary caregiver 
role – rather than relying on private sector childcare. Relationships policy provides a number 
of avenues for governments to accomplish pro-traditionalist objectives, because they may act 
to safeguard the traditional family at both the institutional and individual levels. 
Pro-egalitarian model 
The chief objective of pro-egalitarian family policies is to promote gender equality 
(Gauthier, 1996, p. 204) by supporting women’s participation in paid employment, and men’s 
participation in care work. A somewhat broader definition that acknowledges other forms of 
discrimination (particularly those based on sexual orientation and ethnicity) may now be 
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appropriate. Pro-egalitarianism is essentially diametrically opposed to pro-traditionalism in 
its objectives, although it may encompass a similar level of government intervention.  
Pro-family but non-interventionist model 
Gauthier (1996, p. 204) identifies the non-interventionist model as one in which 
government intervention is restricted to dealing with the most vulnerable families. While a 
non-interventionist government may take a positive view of the institutions of marriage and 
the family, this does not justify the government intervening to promote them. Rather, a non-
interventionist government takes the position that the best way to support these institutions is 
to allow them to develop on their own. 
From these ideological perspectives, I suggest that the following table (based 
primarily on policies present in the three countries at hand) represents the policies that an 
ideal-typical adherent of each perspective would promote. 
 
Table: Characteristics of relationships policy models 
  Pro-traditionalism Pro-egalitarianism Non-interventionism 
Legal status of 
relationships 
High level of rights and 
responsibilities for 





alongside or in place of 
marriage 
Provision of legal 
frameworks for 
alternative family forms 
as needs or injustice arise 
Gendered rights and 
responsibilities within 
marriage 
Degendered rights and 
responsibilities within 
marriage 
Degendered rights and 
responsibilities within 
marriage 
Alternative family forms 
possess equal rights and 
responsibilities 
Substantial equality of 
rights and 
responsibilities, but 












Marriage education Relationship education Anti-violence education 
Promotion of marriage 
as ideal family form 


















Equality of outcomes in 
property settlements 


















protected, not necessarily 
equally 
  Tax and 
welfare 
Tax advantages for 
male-breadwinner 
marriages 
Individual basis for 
taxation 
Individual basis for 
taxation 
Preferential treatment of 
widows over other sole 
parents 
Individual basis for 
welfare entitlements 
Married people treated 
differently to reduce costs 
 
DIVERGING MODELS 
On the basis of this scheme, none of the three countries has employed a “pure” model 
at any point between 1990 and 2014. In 1990, each country mixed elements of the pro-
traditionalist and non-interventionist models. Since this point, however, while few aspects of 
American policy have changed markedly, Australasian policy has almost entirely rejected 
pro-traditionalism for non-interventionism (though New Zealand policy also includes pro-
egalitarian elements). 
Individual policy areas 
Divorce law is one of the most stable areas of relationships policy in all three 
countries. While the ancillary practices surrounding relationship breakdowns have shifted 
somewhat, the bases for divorce remain static. Two basic models of divorce exist: the 
exclusive no-fault model practised across Australasia and the Western United States, and the 
non-exclusive no-fault model practised across the North-eastern and Southern United States. 
The two models are fundamentally non-interventionist, rejecting state intervention to 
force dysfunctional couples to stay together or to prevent them from forming new 
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relationships. However, while the exclusive model rejects state inspection of the details of a 
marriage, the non-exclusive model upholds a “correct” form of marital behaviour, 
condemning sexual unfaithfulness and intemperance. While this sometimes gives wives 
leverage over their husbands (especially where fault extends into property settlements), the 
primary purpose of fault grounds is the enforcement of traditional morality. Pre-divorce 
waiting periods in Australasia perform a similar role, allowing the state to uphold the 
permanence of marriage, but do not allow the state to police behaviour within relationships. 
Marriages are considered social goods worth preserving, but remain fundamentally private. 
Offering covenant marriage does not significantly change the character of a divorce model 
because, while theoretically pro-traditionalist, covenant marriages retain no-fault divorce and 
are optional in any case.  
In 1990, Australasian family courts and some American states provided access to 
marriage counselling services. Although relationship reconciliation counselling is not 
necessary pro-traditionalist, these services privileged marital relationships, treated marriage 
as central to family wellbeing, and allowed courts to compel couples to attempt 
reconciliation. Other American states lacked a tradition of state-provided relationship 
services; while law sometimes required that courts consider reconciliation, the government 
provided no meaningful assistance to facilitate it. Over the ensuring twenty-five years, the 
Australasian systems and many of the American states with conciliation courts that had 
provided reconciliation support transitioned to a non-interventionist approach emphasising 
conciliation and child wellbeing (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, 2014). The 
recognition of de facto relationships in New Zealand meant that it first moved to a quasi-
egalitarian system that treated all relationships as potentially worth preserving. The 
termination of these services, however, means that there is now a broad non-interventionist 
consensus across the three countries in this area. 
The first prominent point of difference between Australasian and American 
relationships policy development is the issue of alternative heterosexual relationships. By 
1990, Australian states had already begun devising formal legal regimes to deal with the 
aftermath of de facto relationships, a non-interventionist approach that retained the privileged 
position of marriage while providing security for a vulnerable group. New Zealand followed 
suit in 2001 in a slightly more egalitarian vein, placing de facto property in the same scheme 
as matrimonial property rather than in a separate, potential inferior process, as the Australian 
constitution necessitated. Further egalitarian shifts followed in each country; New Zealand 
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and the Australian Commonwealth dramatically reduced the differences between the rights 
and responsibilities of de facto and married couples in 2004 and 2008 respectively. New 
Zealand’s 2004 establishment of civil unions as an alternative institution highlighted its pro-
egalitarian shift; marriage-sceptics could affirm their commitment without buying into the 
cultural assumptions around marriage. While registered relationships (from 2003) in some 
Australian states perform a similar role, these are largely not ceremonial in nature. 
American policies for alternative heterosexual relationships remain almost exclusively 
pro-traditionalist. Most unions devised after 1996 to stave off judicial demands for same-sex 
marriage apply only to same-sex couples and elderly opposite-sex couples (allowing them to 
retain social security claims based on previous marriages (Bowman, 2004, p. 137). 
Washington’s “marriage-like” relationship category equates to the non-interventionist de 
facto property reforms in Australasia, but in most cases cohabitants are treated as family only 
in extreme circumstances such as following work-related deaths (Bowman, 2004; Francis, 
2014, p. 140). Outside Washington, these policies are all clearly pro-traditionalist, providing 
clear incentives for couples to marry and disadvantaging financially-vulnerable people who 
feel too insecure to marry and those ideologically opposed to marriage. 
The swiftest changes in policy have occurred in the treatment of same-sex 
relationships. Before 1994, no country or state provided meaningful recognition for same-sex 
relationships. The federal governments of America and Australia accentuated this pro-
traditionalist stance in 1996 and 2004 respectively by defining marriage in heterosexual 
terms. However, New Zealand and the Australian states pursued a non-interventionist path, 
retaining the exclusivity of marriage while extending rights to same-sex couples on the same 
basis as alternative heterosexual couples, effectively granting these relationships “accepted, 
but not preferred” status. New Zealand and Australia subsequently granted alternative 
heterosexual couples equivalent rights and responsibilities to marriage. New Zealand then 
adopted same-sex marriage, and American courts began to enforce same-sex marriage 
recognition, a pro-egalitarian turn, though not necessarily a decisive one. 
The fate of transitional alternative relationships following the recognition of same-sex 
marriage is a revealing point of divergence. Whereas New Zealand retains both civil unions 
and same-sex marriage, American states that create civil unions or partnerships and 
subsequently legalise same-sex marriage typically terminate the registration of new civil 
unions (Vermont Freedom to Marry, n.d.) or convert existing partnerships into marriages 
(Washington Secretary of State, 2014). Similarly, the ACT Marriage Equality (Same Sex) 
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Act 2013 would have repealed that state’s Civil Unions Act 2012 had it survived judicial 
review. Once same-sex couples are eligible to marry, they become subject to the same pro-
traditionalist preference for marriage as opposite-sex couples. Civil unions exist as a genuine 
alternative relationship only in New Zealand. 
The use of different tax regimes for married and single earners in America is a 
fundamental point of difference between its relationships policies and those of Australia and 
New Zealand. The married tax regime is strongly pro-traditionalist both because it 
exclusively benefits married couples (and, before 2013, only heterosexual married couples) 
rather than all financially interdependent couples, and because it advantages sole-earner 
families, most likely to be male-breadwinner families. The Republican marriage penalty 
reform package emphasised these characteristics, minimising financial disincentives against 
marriage for dual-earner couples while preserving the single-earner advantage. 
While neither Australia nor New Zealand has joint taxation – so the basic tax regime 
in each is non-interventionist – Australia’s adoption of FTB-B was a somewhat pro-
traditionalist move as it advantaged single-earner families. Eligibility and payment levels for 
benefits in both countries take relationship status into account (DHS, 2014b), but as a means 
of reducing government obligations, rather than to promote relationship formation. Both 
governments took a functionalist approach here even while their relationships policy 
otherwise relied exclusively on form; Australia’s Social Security Act 1991 (s. 4(2-3)) based 
eligibility around a definition of a couple that included couples in “marriage-like 
relationship[s]”, while New Zealand’s Social Security Act 1964 (s. 63) treats spouses living 
apart as unpartnered, and unmarried couples as partnered. 
America and Australia have increased government support for premarital education. 
In America, this is constructed in a strongly pro-traditionalist fashion; state-based initiatives 
are connected to licensing processes, so while people in other relationships might access 
them, they would not receive the incentives in place to encourage couples to make use of 
them. HMRF is not confined exclusively to premarital education; HMRF-funded programmes 
may attempt to shape American marriages at many different stages. USC 42§603(a)(2)(C)(i) 
allows faith-based organisations to claim HMRF funding, potentially allowing them to 
promote traditionalist interpretations of marriage, although there is no requirement for this to 
happen. While people in other relationships may access some HMRF-funded services, the 
programme promotes marriage as a mechanism for improving their relationships. 
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Kevin Andrews suggests that his premarital counselling scheme continues a longer 
history of the Australian federal government funding organisations that provide relationship 
education (Penberth & Andrews, 2014). Andrews’ scheme nonetheless reflects a new 
emphasis on the area. While Andrews’ intent is explicit in addressing the rate and cost of 
divorce, the pro-traditional intent of the scheme is suppressed by its non-interventionist 
construction (Maley & Bright, 2013). 
Overall changes 
While there was some variation in policy specifics between the three countries in the 
1990s, they nevertheless shared a common set of values and assumptions at their core. Each 
privileged marriage over other relationships and denied recognition to same-sex relationships, 
but allowed dysfunctional couples to divorce and remarry freely. American policy placed 
somewhat more emphasis on shaping behaviour within relationships, while Australia and 
New Zealand provided greater support for couples to reconcile. 
Australia and America made pro-traditionalist changes from 1996, increasing 
financial incentives for “traditional” families and re-emphasising the heterosexual exclusivity 
of marriage. However, the federal pro-traditionalist turn in Australia was mitigated by state-
level developments protecting alternative heterosexual and homosexual relationships, and the 
erosion of support for reconciliation in the Family Court. With support for male-breadwinner 
families on the way out, Australia must be understood as a non-interventionist regime. New 
Zealand did not make the same pro-traditionalist turn, but echoed the other Australian 
developments, moving to a more firmly non-interventionist model with some pro-egalitarian 
aspects, reinforced by its adoption of same-sex marriage and retention of civil unions. 
While court judgements supporting same-sex marriage in the United States have 
eroded one pro-traditionalist aspect of its policy, they have also reinforced the position of 
marriage at the centre of American relationships policy. Marriage may now be a broader 
institution, but it is once again the only institution, supported and used by an array of federal 
and state policies. Consequently, American relationships policy remains a hybrid of pro-
traditionalism and non-interventionism. 
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CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS 
PATH DEPENDENCY 
In this section, I discuss the existence of path dependent processes in relationships 
policy, examining how early decisions constrain policy choices in certain areas. Path 
dependence is a core concept of historical institutionalism; supportive theorists argue that 
decisions made early in the history of institutions will “persistent[ly] influence” that 
institution. Consequently, Peters (2008, pp. 3–4) suggests that path dependence can explain 
policy persistence, but that this focus prevents it from developing strong explanations for 
policy change. Strach (2007, pp. 12–13) suggests that policies consist of sets of values and 
assumptions, and that these may be either core or peripheral elements of policies. “Policy 
entrepreneurs” may exploit “policy gaps” that form as the values and assumptions of society 
diverge from those found in policies. Core values and assumptions are far less vulnerable to 
change than peripheral issues, because resolving gaps in the core of a policy involves a 
complete restructuring. 
Pierson (2000) observes that “path dependence” means little when used to simply 
state the importance of observing policy trajectories through history. Pierson suggests that an 
“increasing returns” model of path dependence is most useful. In this model, each decision 
along a particular path makes it more likely for subsequent decisions to follow the same path 
rather than switching, because the relative cost of switching paths rises with each step along 
the initial path. Although this language is tied to economics it may equally well involve social 
or political costs as changes to well-established practices disrupt society and well-established 
policy-based rights become perceived as inherent. 
Mahoney (2000, p. 511) suggests that path dependent processes possess three 
properties. They must be “contingent”: if an initial decision is predictable from its 
circumstances, then a sequence of events reacting to that event may be a response to those 
initial circumstances, rather than the policy choice itself. Additionally, path dependent 
processes must be most sensitive to events occurring early in their history, and should have 
some form of “inertia”. In an “increasing returns” process, inertia comes from policies that 
are “self-reinforcing”. “Reactive” sequences may also occur in which inertia results from 
logical processes of reactions and counter-reactions. 
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Financial matters 
America’s 2001 pro-marriage tax changes are the product of a path with its origins in 
American federalism. The adoption of marital taxation was not in itself necessarily a 
contingent event. Strach (2007, p. 96) suggests that it stemmed from community property 
states treating married couples as single entities. This practice originated in the Spanish 
origins of most community states’ legal systems (Leiter, 2008, p. 459), setting the contingent 
event for the path further back in history. The federal government could not readily change 
these practices; joint taxation allowed it to treat married couples nationwide equitably. The 
Australasian governments might have devised joint taxation systems without this restriction 
but did not; Australia’s Income Tax Assessment Act 1913 and New Zealand’s Land and 
Income Assessment Act 1891 treated income on a purely individual basis; the latter Act 
explicitly stated that a married woman should be treated “as if she were sole and unmarried” 
(s. 39). 
Australasian politicians’ attempts to create income-splitting systems suggest that there 
are high costs to changing embedded tax systems. John Howard’s Family Tax Initiative and 
Peter Dunne’s Taxation (Income-sharing Tax Credit) Bill 2010 in New Zealand targeted 
partnered parents (rather than marriages or even couples in general). While the Family Tax 
Initiative went into force and survived a considerably less pro-traditionalist ALP government, 
it was a marginal expenditure (initially a minor tax bracket adjustment, then a means-tested 
payment), rather than a significant restructuring of the income tax system, leaving it 
vulnerable to Abbott’s austerity drive. Dunne’s bill, a more significant restructuring of tax 
calculations, failed to attract support beyond its first reading. Howard retained the core 
assumption of individual taxation by altering its peripheral assumptions (that it should 
acknowledge single-earner families); Dunne sought to change core assumptions without a 
sufficient policy gap to justify this restructuring. The Christian Democrats (1996) did identify 
a need to prevent married couples from financial disadvantage relative to cohabitants in the 
1990s, but without demonstrating a disadvantage comparable to that faced by some 
Americans. Moreover, neither major New Zealand party took this up as a core issue, as in 
America, where both major presidential candidates promised marriage penalty relief in 2000 
(Bush-Cheney, 2000; Gore-Lieberman, 2000), and the Christian Democrats did not enter 
Parliament to bargain for reform.  
The use of functional bases for determining welfare entitlements in Australasia also 
contributed to reducing marriage penalties in these systems. This undermined the case for 
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favouring marriage in other areas, facilitating the development of de facto relationship 
protections. Recognising cohabitation “in the nature of marriage” allowed governments to 
remove financial incentives for couples to cohabit without marrying (a pro-traditionalist 
justification) and reduced unnecessary expenditure (a non-interventionist justification). It also 
created a moral precedent for recognising de facto relationships by establishing the 
government’s right to scrutinise its citizens’ “private” lives, and a legal precedent for defining 
these relationships (Sackville, Gressier, & Cass, 1981); America lacks both precedents. 
Furthermore, it created perceptions of injustice by assuming that de facto partners would take 
responsibility for each other without granting them corresponding rights. 
Ending relationships 
Relationship exit policy is an obvious area to look for path dependence as its basic 
architecture (divorce law) has remained almost unchanged since the 1980s. While Pierson 
and Mahoney prefer to look for ‘small moments’ leading to large developments, and the 
adoption of no-fault divorce is a ‘big moment’ in the context of relationships policy, the field 
nevertheless meets Mahoney’s criteria for path dependence. 
Whether the adoption of no-fault divorce constitutes a contingent event is not the 
crucial question. The conditions of no-fault divorce’s establishment – post-war acceleration 
in marital breakdown – do explain why divorce policy was of interest to all (if not necessarily 
why they settled on no-fault divorce), but they do not explain why various states and 
countries selected particular approaches to no-fault divorce. Geographical groupings exist 
that suggest policy transfer between neighbours, and Wolfinger (2005, p. 407) describes 
California’s 1970 law as the “landmark no-fault divorce law”, but not all states followed their 
neighbours’ approaches, nor did states that followed California necessarily follow its 
example. The Uniform Law Commission disseminated a (exclusive no-fault) Marriage and 
Divorce Act in 1973, but only six states adopted it
18
 (Sweet, 2005; Uniform Law 
Commission, 2014). Most importantly, these factors do not explain why one policy would be 
inherently more suitable to the circumstances of a particular country or state than another, so 
these original policies can be considered contingent events. 
The persistence of the divorce laws of the 1970s and 1980s throughout 1990-2014 
indicates in itself that early events strongly impact later policy developments. When changes 
occur, they reinforce the character of these original developments, rather than changing 
                                                 
18
 Supposedly including Georgia, which retains fault grounds (Official Code of Georgia §19-5-3). 
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overall models. New York, the state with the most traditionalist divorce regime, pegged a 
unilateral ground to its existing law; New Jersey’s Act No. 6 of 2007 added a somewhat 
shorter separation-based ground to its existing law. This liberalisation by addition recalls the 
process of adding divorce grounds prior to the no-fault “revolution”. Even covenant marriage, 
which emerged from religious conservatives’ alarm about the future of the institution of 
marriage triggered by Baehr v. Lewin (Nock et al., 1999, pp. 45–46), retained the very 
structures that it rebelled against. New Zealand and Australian law is similarly static; while 
John Howard promoted a longer separation period in 1975 (Murray, 2010, p. 243), his 
government made no attempts to fulfil this. Helen Clark’s 1999-2008 New Zealand 
government retained the FPA’s 2-year separation period despite its purported antagonism 
toward marriage. 
De facto relationships policy may contribute to static divorce laws. When people can 
leave marriages and enter second relationships without officially divorcing their spouses, the 
importance of a speedy divorce process is considerably reduced. Consequently, Australia and 
New Zealand’s provision for de facto polygamy may relieve pressure on these countries’ 
separation periods, while America’s short or non-existent waiting periods eliminate one 
justification for recognising de facto relationships. The key issue in Australia and New 
Zealand is not an efficient divorce, but an efficient separation. 
Same-sex marriage 
The progress of same-sex marriage through the American legal system appears on one 
level to display a pattern of reactive path dependence. The reactions and counter-reactions to 
court actions beginning with Baehr v. Lewin follow a logical pattern as guided by American 
constitutional processes. The possibility for a Hawaiʻian court to force the rest of America to 
recognise same-sex marriages created an environment in which the logical reaction for same-
sex marriage opponents was to disable this mechanism through DOMA and pursue laws 
allowing their state to ignore others’ decisions on the grounds of public policy. These 
demonstrations of the legislative strength of same-sex marriage opponents forced LGBT 
rights campaigners to pursue judicial review of these laws. Their victory in Massachusetts 
revealed the vulnerability of unentrenched legislation, forcing same-sex marriage opponents 
to target state constitutions, leading in turn to challenges to state constitutions on the basis of 
the US constitution. 
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While the decisions of the interest groups involved in this process are logically 
consequent to the decisions made in previous steps, this does not necessarily apply to judges’ 
decisions. Constitutional law is a highly contested area, and judges’ opinions may be heavily 
guided by factors that lie outside the strict contents of laws and constitutions, such as public 
opinion (Kagan, 2004) and personal ideology. However, because the actions of one state 
potentially affect many others, only one decision favourable to LGBT rights advocates is 
necessary to advance the chain of events. Increasing returns may also come into play as the 
path continues. 
Increasing public acceptance of same-sex relationships may affect judges’ decision-
making, but this may itself be related to the decisions of other judges to recognise same-sex 
relationships. The recognition of same-sex relationships in one state creates knowledge 
(whether ‘academic’ or ‘lay’) about its social effects, potentially influencing proceedings in 
other jurisdictions. Increasing returns are also significant in that, as the reactive sequence 
proceeds, the costs of action for same-sex marriage opponents increase dramatically. 
Persuading legislators to clarify existing, popular policy is relatively simple, and raising 
support for a state constitutional amendment is somewhat more complex, but pursuing an 
amendment to the US Constitution requires a vast organisational capacity, given that it 
requires the consent of supermajorities of the States and, usually, of both houses of Congress 
(Bianco & Canon, 2011, p. 56). In 2006, when a constitutional amendment might conceivably 
have succeeded, its opponents could still claim that federal intervention was unnecessary as 
states were deciding the issue themselves (Baldwin, 2006, p. H5293). By the time that LGBT 
activists won a federal constitutional case, both public opinion and control of the Senate had 
shifted. 
INTEREST REPRESENTATION 
While path dependence is an important concept in understanding why particular 
policy options are very difficult to achieve, alternative explanations are needed for 
understanding why many policy changes occur. The analysis of institutions of interest 
representation helps to identify not only how one policy option might be selected from a 
range of possible solutions, but also why the policy problem at hand is being addressed. In 
this section, I explore how the policy-making influence exercised by a range of interests 
(religious, women’s, LGBT, and legal) is affected by the institutional contexts of the three 
countries. 
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Religious interests 
Conservative Christians (or the “Christian Right”) are significant supporters of pro-
traditionalist relationships policies. The Christian Right has mobilised in recent decades as a 
series of social movements (and counter-movements), interest groups, think-tanks, parties 
and candidates. While the Christian Right is most closely associated with conservative 
Protestantism, Protestants have made alliances with conservative Catholics on some issues 
(Lugg, 2007, pp. 324–325). 
The American Christian Right is a complex, multi-layered network; prominent 
national-level organisations such as the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family work 
alongside local organisations and grassroots members (Myers, 2010, pp. 273–274). 
Politicised Australian organisations such as the Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) adopt 
centrist images (Melleuish, 2010, pp. 916–917), although the ACL nevertheless takes pro-
traditionalist positions on family-related issues (ACL, 2014a, 2014b). Key Anglican and 
Catholic leaders also campaign on these issues (Melleuish, 2010, pp. 918–920), alongside 
several microparties associated with Pentecostal churches. New Zealand lacks prominent, 
explicitly-Christian, national-level conservative interest groups, although the theoretically 
secular Family First NZ organisation has campaigned on Christian conservative issues since 
2006 (Family First NZ, 2006). 
The American Christian Right has been most successful in shaping relationships 
policy. Americans are considerably more likely than their Antipodean counterparts to believe 
strongly and attend church regularly (Lipka, 2013), creating greater incentives for politicians 
to appeal to religious views. The American political system also offers structural 
opportunities for religious groups. The importance of local organisations, particularly in 
candidate selection, means that local religious interests may capture local selection processes 
to promote sympathetic candidates. Bruce (2003, p. 422) suggests that the large number of 
elections in America benefits religious interests because voters organised through religious 
organisations may be more highly motivated to fully participate than the population as a 
whole. Religious organisations’ guidance may be most influential in low profile races such as 
state legislative contests, which are significant for relationships policy because of states’ lead 
role in the area. American legislators’ relative independence also benefits conservative 
Christian interests by offering legislators from conservative areas license to represent their 
constituents without conforming to the expectations of centrally organised parties trying to 
capture that centre. Although American legislators do not necessarily represent the most 
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conservative churches, they are certainly more likely to be Christian than the population as a 
whole (Miller, 2013). 
The selection processes employed by the major parties of New Zealand and Australia 
make similar grassroots attempts to capture selection processes impractical. Australian Senate 
pre-selections and New Zealand list selection processes take place at the state and national 
levels respectively, so are not subject to branch-packing. New Zealand local branches do not 
have a free selection of candidates; the NZNP hierarchy may block undesirable candidates 
(NZNP, 2013, sec. 94), while Labour selection committees include national representatives 
(NZLP, 2014, sec. 314). Australian state parties possess varying but significant roles in 
House pre-selections, and may replace locally-chosen candidates (Crook, 2009a, 2009b); the 
Western Australian Liberals supply delegates to selection committees and can unilaterally 
cancel selections (LPA, 2012, sec. 117(1)(b); 130). While Christian groups have recently 
been accused of branch-packing to dictate selections in both countries, they failed to 
influence the outcomes (Cheng, 2014; Kerr, 2011). 
The LPA, NPA, and ALP have significant Christian connections which occasionally 
influence their decision-making, although they are not necessarily connected to the Christian 
Right as a movement. The NPA Constitution sets the promotion of “a society based on 
Christian ethics and loyalty to the Crown” as its first objective (NPA, 2013, s. 2.1(a)(i)). The 
ALP and LPA historically enjoyed the support of Catholics and Protestants respectively, but 
this has weakened recently; weakening interdenominational antagonism has seen more 
Catholics joining and exercising authority inside the LPA, while the ALP has become the 
party of secularism (Brett, 2003, pp. 35, 132) – though Catholics certainly retain influence 
within some factions. Warhurst (2006) suggests that Catholics’ rising influence within the 
LPA caused socially-conservative policy changes during the Howard government. Kevin 
Andrews and Tony Abbott featured prominently in this rise; Andrews and Abbott enjoy still 
greater potential influence in the current government as Prime Minister and (until December 
2014) Minister for Social Services respectively. 
The relatively open party systems of Australia and post-MMP New Zealand allow 
conservative Christians to bypass major parties by forming movement parties. This 
theoretically allows Christian politicians to prioritise moral issues that might be lost amidst 
competing concerns in major parties. These parties’ electoral performances, however, suggest 
that this is a false opportunity, and may actually hurt New Zealand Christian conservatives. 
New Zealand Christian parties’ support is neither sufficiently localised to meet the electorate 
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seat threshold, nor sufficiently broad-based to meet the party vote threshold. To enter 
Parliament, Christians have had to moderate their demands in keeping with Ezrow’s (2011) 
proposition that parties in proportional systems construct policies for median voters rather 
than their base. Candidates from Future New Zealand (itself the moderate counterpart of the 
Christian Heritage Party (Edwards, 2003, p. 180)) entered Parliament in 2002 and 2005 only 
by allying with the liberal United New Zealand party. 
Although confidence and supply agreements with Labour contributed to the 
development of the Families Commission (Clark & Dunne, 2002, 2005), the Commission 
never matched the vision embodied in these agreements, and the agreements themselves 
avoided promoting pro-traditionalist views of family. Moderating their demands allowed 
socially-conservative Christian politicians to enter parliament and argue against key policy 
such as the RSRB and CUA, but did not allow them to promote pro-traditionalist policies. 
Despite MMP’s apparent openness, the choice for conservative Christians is between 
compromised representation within broader parties or no representation (and ‘wasted’ votes) 
on their own. The case of John Stringer demonstrates the capacity for movement parties to 
erode the Christian Right’s position within the NZNP; Stringer was involved in promoting 
conservative Christian ideas and candidates through National’s “Christian Voice” group in 
1999, but later moved to the Conservative Party (Edwards, 2003, p. 345; Young, 2014). 
Australian Christian conservatives have been marginally more successful in gaining 
Parliamentary representation as movement parties. The Christian Democratic Party has a 
small contingent in New South Wales, but has only been represented at federal level by a 
Liberal defector. Family First has gained representation in the Senate and some state 
legislatures. Family First does not explicitly market itself as Christian, but draws candidates 
and support from Pentecostal churches (Fitzgerald, 2014; Murphy, 2004). Even when 
unsuccessful, however, these parties may exercise a certain degree of influence through 
preference deals with larger parties. 
Consequently, during the MMP era, the balance between moral conservatives and 
liberals with the NZNP has been weighted heavily towards liberals, while the Australian 
Coalition and the Republicans have given greater power to Christian conservatives. This 
position allows conservatives to periodically override economic rationalist and social liberals’ 
objections. Republic Chuck Grassley (2005, pp. S13095, S13125) pointed to the social and 
economic benefits to be obtained from promoting marriage to the poor, while Kevin Andrews 
(2014) justified relationship education spending on the costs of family breakdown. In each 
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case, conservative politicians successfully pushed pro-traditionalist expenditure within tight 
fiscal environments, although the phase-out of FTB-B at the same time as Andrews’ scheme 
suggests that these pro-traditionalist expenditures remain vulnerable to economic pressures 
even with considerable moral conservative representation. 
Women’s interests 
As Christian conservatives have campaigned for pro-traditionalist reforms, the 
feminist movement has been a voice for pro-egalitarian reform. Feminists have long criticised 
marriage as an oppressive institution, demanding its reform or, on the radical flank, 
eradication (Auchmuty, 2012, p. 82). “Traditional” marriage, in feminist critiques, constrains 
women’s life choices, making them financially dependent on men. Consequently, divorce and 
property law reform and support for alternative relationships are feminist issues, although 
they must compete with a large array of other issues for the attention of the movement. 
Feminists have not formed movement parties to contest elections independently
19
; 
rather, feminists work within the institutional structures of mainstream parties, or outside 
them to lobby policy-makers. American feminist organisations such as EMILY’s List (a 
partisan Democratic organisation) and the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC) take 
an active role in elections by endorsing and co-ordinating fundraising for feminist women 
(EMILY’s List, 2014; NWPC, 2014a). Both organisations, however, focus primarily on 
abortion, rather than relationships policy. EMILY’s List (Australia) (2014) performs a similar 
role for the ALP, and does look beyond abortion. 
The radicalism of feminist organisations varies considerably, and indeed many 
women’s organisations are either anti-feminist or not explicitly feminist. CWfA (2014), 
which claims to be America’s “largest public policy women's organization”, marries 
women’s interests with Christian conservatism; this allows conservatives to challenge 
feminists’ organisations claims to represent all women, and to frame the pro-traditionalist 
agenda as positive for women rather than oppressive. In New Zealand and Australia, national 
networks of women’s organisations encompass both feminist and non-feminist organisations, 
occasionally complicating their policy commentary or preventing them from commenting 
firmly on controversial issues. On income splitting, for example, the National Council of 
Women of New Zealand (NCWNZ, 2009) presented both strongly-favourable and strongly-
                                                 
19
 Except for Australia’s short-lived What Women Want party. 
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opposed perspectives. While NCWNZ did participate in debate on the PRA (Yates (2001)), 
along with other women’s organisations, it did not initiate the debate. 
Hart (2003, p. 397) suggests that women’s representation in legislatures is important 
because male-dominated legislatures neglect issues that are chiefly of importance to women. 
Women’s representation help to raise women’s problems to public attention, and then shape 
the policies developed to address them. Women legislators must, however, still work through 
standard legislative procedures to bring their issues to attention. Most Australasian legislation 
is initiated by government, rather than backbenchers (New Zealand Parliament, 2009; 
Parliament of Australia, 2014a, p. 3), requiring women to be represented in government, 
rather than simply in legislatures, to significantly influence policy. 
The Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues unites women legislators from both 
major American parties to promote action of women’s issues (Keremidchieva, 2012, pp. 18–
19) and lobby political and administrative leaders (Ernst, 2006, pp. 223–227). However, the 
ideological differences within this caucus make it an impractical venue for feminists to use to 
promote pro-egalitarian policy. Consequently, the Caucus’ focus is on protections for 
vulnerable women (particularly relating to healthcare (Daly, 2009; Women’s Policy, 2014)), 
rather than transforming oppressive structures. 
Engaging with mainstream political parties can be an uncertain mechanism for 
women to advance their interests. While almost all major parties in each country have 
processes to include women in their internal politics, these do not necessarily result in the 
election of women. The major parties of the US and Australia require significant 
representation of women in their national organisations, but only the ALP sets a target for 
candidates (ALP, 2011, pt. B(10); DNC, 2012; LPA, 2010, pt. X; NPA, 2013, sec. 8.1; RNC, 
2014). The NZLP (2014, s. 351) uses affirmative action throughout its structure, including in 
list selection, but National (2013) makes no provisions for gender-based representation. The 
interactions of internal rules with electoral systems produce starkly differing results. The 
NZNP elects a greater proportion of women than its right-wing colleagues, while the ALP 
elects a greater proportion of women than its left-wing colleagues (NWPC, 2014b; NZEC, 
2011; Parliament of Australia, 2014b). The ALP’s quota for women’s representation not only 
ensures the presence of women in Parliament, but also frees up interest group resources for 
other priorities. EMILY’s List in Australia can focus its attention on developing endorsed 
candidates, whereas the American group must start with candidate recruitment (EMILY’s 
List, 2014; EMILY’s List (Australia), 2014). 
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The ascent of women to the leadership of both major New Zealand parties in the 
1990s may have contributed to the elevation of de facto property legislation from a vague 
commitment in Labour manifestos (NZLP, 1987, p. 26) (which the party did not action in 
government) to a national policy issue, and to the eventual shape of the legislation. National 
(1993, 1996) did not promote relationship property reform as a significant issue, producing a 
bill only after Jenny Shipley – who had been working on the issue for some time (Shipley, 
1998, p. 6699) – became Prime Minister. Shipley suggested that Helen Clark had been unable 
to persuade her colleagues to take up the issue; ascending to the Prime Ministership allowed 
these women leaders to set the agenda to advance women’s interests for the first time. Upon 
the election of the Clark government, the new attorney-general Margaret Wilson (a member 
of a number of gender equality groups) reshaped the bill. While the select committee 
prevented Wilson’s attempts to remove marriage language from the bill, the new bill was 
considerably more pro-egalitarian than National’s proposal. 
LGBT interests 
LGBT interests are somewhat less institutionalised and more social movement-based 
than women’s interests. While LGBT representation in legislatures has increased and LGBT 
networks have become features of left-wing parties, the marriage equality movement has 
developed alongside or outside these formal political institutions. In Australasia this involves 
a mixture of dedicated issue organisations and networks, broader LGBT rights organisations 
and networks and party networks, while in America it also involves dedicated legal advocacy 
organisations. 
LGBT Labo(u)r party members have developed “Rainbow” networks. Openly-gay 
MP Tim Barnett and former (and future) MP Chris Carter established New Zealand Rainbow 
Labour (NZRL) in 1997 to encourage LGBT political involvement (NZRL, 2000), while 
Rainbow Labor networks in Australia were formed from 2002 (Rainbow Labor QLD, 2014). 
The Democrats also include various LGBT networks, including the congressional LGBT 
Equality Caucus (2014) (which includes straight legislators), founded in 2008, the National 
Stonewall Democrats campaigning organisation between 1998 and 2013 (Lavers, 2013), and 
various state-level organisations (eg. Arizona LGBT Caucus, 2013). 
These organisations claim significant roles in policy-making, including lobbying for 
civil unions in New Zealand (NZRL, 2007) and persuading the ALP to formally support 
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same-sex marriage (Karvelas, 2013). While this is an important role, strong (but not 
universal) support within left-wing parties is often insufficient in advancing pro-LGBT 
policies. While NZLP representatives supported civil unions nearly unanimously, the narrow 
electoral margins of MMP forced them to rely on right-wing social liberals, whose support 
became even more crucial in passing same-sex marriage from opposition. In Australia, 
winning the formal backing of the ALP for same-sex marriage has proven insufficient, 
because of both strong conservative factions within the party and Tony Abbott’s refusal to 
allow a conscience vote, disabling access to social liberal Liberals. 
American LGBT lobbyists adapt their tactics to exploit the opportunities provided by 
the courts. Not all same-sex marriage cases have had strong organisational support. 
Nevertheless, one organisation – Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) – provided 
representation for several of the most significant cases, winning civil unions in Vermont, 
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts (GLAD, 2008), and a finding that Section 3 of DOMA 
was unconstitutional (GLAD, 2013). The involvement of a national movement organisation 
in these cases enabled plaintiffs to sustain complex, multi-year legal challenges, while 
developing the capacity of the organisation itself. 
The practical impact of non-legal movement organisations is more difficult to gauge. Each 
country has both generalist LGBT rights organisations that build awareness of and support 
for sexual minorities, and specialist same-sex marriage lobbying organisations. American 
organisations may influence public support with reasonably direct consequences for policy by 
participating in referenda (Human Rights Campaign, 2014); in most cases this means 
resisting pro-traditionalist initiatives rather than advancing pro-egalitarian policy. Promoting 
same-sex relationship rights via referendum would have been technically possible in New 
Zealand, but would also have been extraordinarily organisationally-demanding without 
guaranteeing government action. 
Influencing public opinion influences policy indirectly by changing the forces 
affecting politicians’ decision-making. Changing public opinion about same-sex marriage 
creates a policy gap between the assumptions of what marriage looks like held by existing 
policy and by the public. This creates opportunities for LGBT-friendly politicians to seize, 
while putting electoral pressure on ambivalent or opposed politicians. Generalist 
organisations facilitate this by promoting its agenda to media organisations and the wider 
community, and encouraging political participation by the LGBT community (Gay & Lesbian 
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Rights Lobby, 2009; GLAAD, 2014). Issue organisations produce issue-specific educational 
resources, facilitate citizen involvement in political processes, and co-ordinate networks of 
supportive organisations (Australian Marriage Equality, 2014a; Freedom to Marry, 2014; 
Marriage Equality, 2013). 
There are interesting contrasts in how issue-specific organisations adapt to the 
institutional opportunities available to them. While Freedom to Marry participates in court 
actions in addition to building public support, Australasian campaigns focus on political 
lobbying. These lobbying campaigns are themselves very different. While Australian 
Marriage Equality is a unitary organisation, its New Zealand counterpart was a coalition of 
partners. Consequently, whereas the Australian campaign is confronting its major 
institutional challenge (Abbott’s whip on same-sex marriage) by co-ordinating citizen emails 
(Australian Marriage Equality, 2014b), the New Zealand campaign seized the opportunities 
created by party structures by partnering with the youth wings of five parties (including ACT 
and National) (Marriage Equality, 2013). These groups could influence their representatives’ 
decision-making through internal party communications and leveraging their members’ 
influence in areas such as selection and campaign support. This does highlight the fact that, 
while institutional opportunities contribute to advancing any agenda, making use of these 
opportunities requires interests to mould their organisations and activities to use these 
opportunities optimally. 
Legal interests 
New South Wales’ De Facto Relationships Act 1984 emerged despite a lack of 
significant female legislative representation or leadership, and without the instigation of non-
institutional women’s interest groups. The impetus for the legislation came from the legal 
community through a New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) report 
(Landa, 1984; Sackville et al., 1981). Sackville et al. report judges’ dissatisfaction with the 
decisions they were forced to make in de facto relationship cases. Similar reports also 
prompted subsequent Australian de facto relationships legislation (Manzie, 1991, p. 1058; 
Sheldon, 1999). Queensland’s commission (QLDLRC, 1992, pp. 2–3, 193) drew on the 
testimony of family lawyers and submitters principally consisting of legal organisations. The 
federal commission also touched on de facto relationships while reviewing matrimonial 
property legislation in 1987, suggesting that extending property division to de facto 
relationships would safeguard the institution of marriage by reducing the gap in 
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responsibilities between marriage and de facto relationships (ALRC, 1987, pp. 191–192), but 
could not actually recommend such a change. 
New Zealand’s Law Commission produced similarly positive recommendations for 
recognising de facto relationships (NZLC, 1997), but it is difficult to claim a path-breaking 
role for the NZLC as with Australia. The  Minister for Justice actually included de facto 
relationships in the original Matrimonial Proceedings Bill in 1975, but the incoming National 
government removed them (Atkin et al., 2013, p. 663). By 1997, the entire weight of the legal 
bureaucracy was working on the issue: the NZLC worked alongside the Ministry of Justice 
with Minister Douglas Graham’s support (NZLC, 1997, p. 55). However, while the bulk of 
responsibility cannot be ascribed to the NZLC, the commission provided a space for large 
numbers of lawyers, judges, and legal academics to shape the reforms (NZLC, 1997, pp. 
171–172). 
American states lack similar sets of institutions for translating the legal community’s 
pragmatism and expertise into legislative action. Attorneys-general are the leading legal 
actors in both federal and state governments. State attorneys-general are primarily responsible 
for defending the state in court and offering legal advice to the executive and legislature 
(Harvard Law Review, 2014, pp. 980–981), but do not lead legislative reforms as they are not 
legislators themselves. Additionally, state attorneys-general generally lack substantial civil 
service departments involved in policy development analogous to Ministries or Departments 
of Justice in Australasia. While they may affect relationships policies, they must use different 
sets of tools; both state and federal attorneys-general have expedited same-sex marriage 
judgements by refusing to defend legislation (Bader, 2010, p. 6; Holder, 2011). 
While law revision commissions do operate in some states, their central purpose is 
discovering “defects and anachronisms” and recommending solutions (CALRC, 2014; 
Michigan Legislative Council, 2014). While this occasionally involves considering 
ideologically-controversial issues, much of their work involves more technical 
considerations. The New Jersey commission’s recent work touching on relationships policy 
includes repealing century-old married women’s property acts rendered unnecessary by the 
development of common law, and proposed revisions of laws that deny property settlements 
to a person whose spouse dies before their divorce is finalised (NJLRC, 2007, 2011). It 
appears that no state commission has investigated the rights of cohabitants or same-sex 
couples. Property matters may occasionally arise, as in a recent Connecticut study seeking 
greater consistency in alimony judgements (Aaron & Schoonmaker, n.d.). Intriguingly, this 
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study did delve into cohabitation, but only in investigating the accessibility of the present 
provisions for ending alimony once the recipient re-partnered (CTLRC, 2014b). 
These commissions’ institutional rules impose certain barriers on taking up key 
relationships policy issues. Legislators’ involvement as commission members may restrict the 
issues which commissions examine and affect the recommendations they produce. While an 
independent commission may examine ideologically-controversial questions and provide 
“objective” advice, the presence of politicians and political appointees means that ideological 
considerations and politicians’ electoral interests may subordinate the representation of legal 
and community interests. Moreover, commissions with uncertain or limited resources may 
concentrate on the important, but less controversial work of resolving defects (which 
bureaucrats might perform elsewhere) rather than on substantive modernisation. 
Representing legal interests in the creation of relationship legislation is crucial in 
moving away from pro-traditionalism because legal actors – and particularly family lawyers 
and judges – have a unique perspective on relationships. De facto relationship property 
division may seem insignificant from the standpoint of ‘ordinary’ citizens, or even to a 
cohabitant (who may not consider the issue for much of the course of their relationship). 
Family lawyers and judges, however, may routinely encounter the issue. The QLDLRC 
(1992, p. 2) found that 98% of family law practitioners had encountered a de facto partner 
seeking legal advice in the past year, and three-quarters supported radical change. These 
encounters prompted support for a non-interventionist approach in which the rights and 
wrongs of non-marital relationships took second place to protecting the vulnerable. This 
perspective extends to at least some American legal actors; the American Bar Association 
(2014, p. 58) includes the extension of government assistance for spouses of terrorism and 
crime victims to unmarried partners amongst its legislative priorities, and in the states where 
de facto partners have received rights to property division, accident compensation, and 
similar “worst case” remedies, these rights developed through the courts (Bowman, 2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Key elements of relationships policy in New Zealand Australia, and the United States 
changed significantly between 1990 and 2014. They did not, however, change evenly or (in 
some cases) in similar directions. This puts into question the theory presented in some single-
case policy histories that relationships policies change in response to social changes, as these 
differences developed despite the countries experiencing similar changes in their relationship 
formation patterns. Many policy actors point to demographic changes as justifications for 
policy change, but this does not mean that their proposed solutions are simply natural and 
inevitable reactions to these changes. The divergent treatment of de facto relationships 
demonstrates this; the prevalence of de facto relationships has increased markedly in each 
country, but their rights have scarcely increased in America while Australia and New Zealand 
have gradually equalised the status of marriage and de facto relationships. Ultimately, 
changes in relationship formation (or in other potentially significant aspects such as culture) 
are translated through historic policy institutions, by policy-makers acting under the restraints 
of political institutions. 
The importance of electoral systems and party systems lies in how they affect the 
opportunities that are available to interests seeking to defend existing policies or promote 
new policies. These systems create veto points and agenda-setting opportunities in the policy-
making process and control who has access to them. Pro-traditionalist interests can prevent 
non-interventionist and pro-egalitarian changes most effectively when they can divide left-
wing parties and unite right-wing parties. The American and Australian systems provide a 
multitude of strong veto points that make legislative shifts away from pro-traditionalist 
policies difficult, and they allow pro-traditionalist interests access to these veto points. The 
local focus of candidate selection in America allows organised, motivated pro-traditionalist 
interests to rally behind pro-traditionalist candidates, while the ALP faction system ensures 
that there is a religious conservative presence within that party. In New Zealand, religious 
conservatives typically do not have access to these veto points, as they are excluded early in 
the system at candidate selection for major parties, or by diverting their attention toward 
minor parties. 
Electoral and party systems also affect how free politicians are to follow their 
convictions or the preferences of their local constituencies rather than their party. When pro-
traditionalist or pro-egalitarian interests (e.g. feminist or LGBT interests) are able to 
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dominate debate on an issue within an Australasian party, they can use the threat of formal or 
informal sanctions to enforce party unity. Australasian party and electoral systems also make 
it more likely that representatives will focus on issues that disproportionately affect women 
by providing mechanisms (of varying effectiveness) for pursuing affirmative action. 
American representatives are less likely to be women, and can act more independently in 
office, because parties have much less control over who is selected to contest seats.  
While political institutional arrangements may allow supporters of pro-traditionalist 
policies to prevent or delay changes, the strength of path dependency in relationships policy 
indicates that they are extremely unlikely to wrest policies back to a pro-traditionalist model 
once they shift. In core areas of relationships policy such as divorce law and the recognition 
of de facto relationships, comprehensive pro-traditionalist reforms require the removal of 
“rights”. Even though the public might not necessarily have claimed these rights prior to their 
introduction, when a very different model might have been equally or more appropriate, the 
idea of removing them after the fact becomes a severe intervention into “private” family life. 
Consequently, pro-traditionalist changes typically make minor changes while reaffirming the 
substance of a policy. Covenant marriage, for example, allows voluntary restrictions of 
divorce rights, but acknowledges the rights of non-participants as valid and relieves pressure 
on more substantial reform. Similarly, pro-traditionalist reforms of civil partnerships in 
Queensland massaged the appearance of the policy into something less offensive to pro-
traditionalists while reaffirming most of the rights of people in these partnerships. 
Past policy decisions may in some situations facilitate future decisions by creating 
policy gaps as societies’ assumptions and practices change, and creating precedents for 
particular changes. The treatment of cohabitants relative to spouses in each country’s tax and 
welfare systems created different kinds of injustices (as seen by particular interests) that 
provided grounds for policy changes. These included de facto property reform in Australasia, 
but also pro-marriage tax and welfare reform in America as the arrangement of interests in 
power meant that only injustices against spouses were recognised. The presence of a 
functional approach to marriage in the Australian and New Zealand welfare systems also 
provided a precedent for recognising de facto relationships. It is not necessarily possible to 
tell how more recent policy changes will influence policy beyond 2014, however, because it 
is not clear what kinds of policy gaps will emerge, or how interests will use aspects of present 
policy as precedents for future changes. 
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Legal interests are also highly influential in relationships policy-making. Strong 
representation of legal interests through law (reform) commissions and justice bureaucracies 
typically strengthens non-interventionist policies. Lawyers have a unique position in 
relationships policy-making because they witness perceived injustices and inefficiencies 
caused by gaps between policies and practices and carry weight in policy debates as learned 
authorities. Judicial bureaucracies also have incentives to minimise expenditure on 
relationship issues to free resources for other areas. Legal institutions may instigate policy 
changes, and their presumed political neutrality may allow governments to deflect criticism 
over raising controversial issues by claiming to be simply responding to their 
recommendations. Legal professionals also possess the expertise required to make specific 
recommendations on policy detail (to the point of providing draft legislation), while less 
expert stakeholders may only be able to supply general recommendations. Legal interests 
have been particularly impactful on driving change in de facto relationships policy, although 
it is also noteworthy that the New Zealand Ministry of Justice’s preference to restrict Family 
Courts activity to ‘essential’ activities provided a basis for non-interventionist change in 
relationship counselling provisions. 
Drawing attention to the interplay of interests within political parties, as ordered by 
their internal processes and electoral systems, is important in looking beyond relationships 
policy to other aspects of family policy. Different interests may be significant in other family 
policy areas – fathers’ rights groups (which play a small role in eroding reconciliation support 
in Australia), for example, may be significant actors in debates on custody issues. However, 
the principle remains that in order to achieve legislative success, supporters of a policy 
change must in almost every case be able to command the loyalty of their party, and the rules 
set by that party, its leaders, and the political system control their ability to do so. 
Paying attention to how institutional contexts establish the opportunities available for 
some of the groups that are specifically important in relationships policy debates (particularly 
religious conservatives and feminists) may also contribute to understanding the development 
of other policy areas where these groups’ priorities conflict. The feminist and conservative 
Christian movements have extraordinarily wide-ranging interests, and often operate as 
movement and counter-movement. The most obvious example is abortion law which is, like 
same-sex marriage, a key battlefield in the American “Culture Wars”, and a conscience vote 
issue for the main Australasian parties. Consequently, many of the factors that affect these 
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interest’s success in relationships policy development may also affect the abortion law 
debate. 
Understanding the development of relationships policy is also important because aspects of 
relationships policy will affect the development of other policy areas. This may potentially 
occur through a reactive form of path dependency, as aspects of relationships policy may 
affect patterns of relationship formation, affecting the number of people in need of 
government support, exacerbating or relieving pressure on government services and 
potentially forcing policy changes. Indeed Republicans have occasionally offered this as a 
reason for rejecting same-sex marriage (Strach, 2007, p. 1). Adopting functionalist definitions 
of relationships may also affect areas such as immigration policy, expanding the pool of 
possible eligible immigrants, with knock-on effects for fields such as housing and healthcare. 
The role of legal interests in the development of relationships policy is also 
potentially significant for the study of other aspects of family policy. Lawyers and judges are 
significant actors in debates over issues such as custody determination, child support and 
youth justice. These are issues that – like de facto relationships (and, in some cases, because 
of de facto relationships) are increasingly important in contemporary society. They are also 
issues in which lawyers and judges have a stake as participants in and beneficiaries of policy 
administration, and as witnesses to perceived injustices and inefficiencies. The influence of 
legal interests also extends beyond Western liberal democracies. My previous work on 
Malaysia and Singapore, which found that Ahmad Ibrahim played a key role in Islamic 
family law reform as Attorney-General of both countries (at different times), suggests that the 
institutionalised representation of legal interests at least offers the opportunity for lawyers 
and judges to influence policy-making in a range of societies. 
The extent of variation between Australia, New Zealand and the United States on 
relationships policy issues suggests that the idea that these three countries share a common 
approach to family policy is significantly flawed. Significant differences have emerged 
between the countries in terms of regulation, and the different approaches that the American 
and Australasian tax and welfare systems take to the role of marriage and relationships in 
determining obligations and entitlements have become further entrenched. Attempts to assess 
the state of “family policy” need to work from a well-rounded picture of state interventions 
into the family rather than concentrating exclusively or near-exclusively on issues relating to 
children and parenting. 
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For all that adult intimate relationships are often considered a private issue in Western 
liberal democracies, they have also been the subject of a considerable amount of public 
contestation over the past twenty-five years. Changes in the ways in which governments 
intervene in the relationships of their citizens are not simply the inevitable outcome of 
changing patterns of relationships. Rather, they are the outcomes of contestations of values, 
assumptions and priorities, played out within institutional environments that shape both the 
opportunities available to the holders of these values, assumptions and priorities, and the 
policies they can pursue. 
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